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The Green Bag

prior accidents leads reasonably and legiti mately to an inference as to the condi tions causing the accident in question, that such happenings are in the nature of an ex perimental use of the instrumentality under consideration, and that they tend to bring home to the responsible parties knowledge of the existing conditions? Against this there is only the contention that such evi dence confuses the minds of jurymen with collateral issues, and tends to delay trials. It is difficult to see, however, why jurymen cannot be trusted with such evidence in the court room, when it is precisely the kind they would give weight to in their ordinary affairs —the experience of others under similar cir cumstances. As to delaying trials, that is not a light charge, in these days of over worked courts; but, after all, the courts exist, not to expedite business, but to do justice and to ascertain truth. Where so many able minds have recorded their convic tion that this is a class of evidence which helps us to get at the truth, shall a court lean towards the side of exclusion rather than admission?" Equity (Conversion). "The Inconsis tencies of the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion," by Walter J. Hart. Law Quarterly Review (vol. xxiv, p. 403). Consideration of the cases on contracts for sale or purchase and trusts for sale or purchase leads the author to the conclu sion that the decisions cannot be reconciled with any consistent principle and the result is that the student must commit to memory a long series of complicated rules which are merely arbitrary. Future Interests (Personalty). "In terests for Life and Quasi- Remainders in Chattels Personal," by David T. Oliver. Law Qu. Review (yo. xxiv, p. 431). The survey of the cases leads the author "to the conclusion that the doctrine of the modern textbooks that all ulterior interests in personalty are executory is erroneous, and that in the case of a gift of personal chattels to A for life and then to B, in a will (and, perhaps, in a deed also), A is to be regarded as a usufructuary and the property vests at once in B." Government (Direct Legislation) . "Some Experiments in Direct Legisla

tion," by Robert Treat Piatt. Yale Law Journal (vol. xviii, p. 40). Commenting on the working of the Oregon system of initiative and referendum. History (England). "The House of Lords," by C. R. A. Howden. Juridical Review (vol. xx, p. 247). Third in a series of articles on the history and constitution of the House of Lords. Income Tax (England) . "The Assess ment of Public Bodies for Income Tax," by E. J. Moore. Law Magazine and Re view (vol. xxxiv, p. 26). International Law. "History of Con traband of War. II," by H. J. Randall. Law Quarterly Review (vol. xxiv, p. 449). Second and final instalment of a valuable historical article. Judgments (Foreign). "The Law of Foreign Judgments with Special Refer ence to Default Judgments of English and Colonial Courts Inter Se," by C. C. McCaul, K. C. Law Quarterly Review (vol. xxiv, p. 412). Jurisprudence (Corporations). "The Juristic Person. I," by George F. Deiser. University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register (vol. lvii, p. 131). An attempt to determine the nature of the person, being or group, through which the will of the collection of members of the cor poration finds expression. The problem is defined as follows: "Corporations, under existing legal systems, for judicial or legislative purposes are re garded in two ways : "I. The corporation is a fictitious person or entity (as in England and the United States). "II. The corporation is a real person (as in Germany, France, Spain, and some other continental countries). "The problems arising under both of these attitudes are these: "A. Does the corporation as a group or unit possess rights and owe duties? "B. Has the corporation as a group or unit criminal or moral responsibility?