Uniform Divorce Legislation-A Reply Of course, this view necessarily re quires a different conception of morality from that invented for us by the the
ologians of the middle ages.
While
religionists have always denounced any moral ideals which either conflict with or have a tendency to supersede their religious teachings, yet it must not be overlooked that when their own morality or that of their doctrines is in question they take refuge in the statement that religion and morality are separate and distinct and that religion is their business. But the statement that men and women cannot live moral lives because of their own innate sense of honor and justice and without unconsciously be coming indebted to Christianity neces sarily implies that there was no morality before Christianity and can be none outside of Christian influences. Of
course, a doctrine of this kind is not unexpected from so misanthropic a religion as orthodox Christianity, and we are therefore not surprised, although appalled, at the hardship, suffering and misery which a portion of the race
has endured because of the influence of these teachings. Whatever may be the true criterion of morality, it is sufficient for this discussion to say that there are many who have come to believe
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for so doing, would be prepared to give some reason for his conception of im morality other than that the granting of divorce is in conflict with ecclesiastical or state legislation as well as traditional social ideals. Never having heard those who delight to call themselves “con servatives” attempt this feat, I therefore challenge them to show wherein divorce is of itself any more immoral than the marriages which it terminates. Indeed, the best authorities upon
social problems are agreed that divorce, instead of being a disease, is the only remedy for many far worse social con ditions which are conspicuous in societies where divorce does not exist. I think this view is rapidly gaining ground among all peoples except those who are still encumbered by their heritage of dogmatic faith. The large increase of divorce in foreign countries and the
important role which a demand for more liberal divorce legislation is at
present playing in
English
politics,
is very good evidence that the changing of opinions upon these matters is not due solely to American legislation or to the absence of uniformity therein. The extension of this conception of divorce naturally affects the number of
statutory
causes
therefor.
For,
that morality does not consist entirely
as soon as it is recognized that there
in being continually uncomfortable.
may be conditions in matrimony which are unavoidable and essentially im
The proposition that “the same act done under color of law, when divorce
moral, the reasonable expectation would
is permitted, is not more moral than when forbidden in a country where no divorce law obtains," while true, causes
be for legislation to meet them and
me to suggest that an act, which in itself is not immoral, is not made so by the enactment of prohibitive legislation,
avoid the undesirable consequences cer tain to result from their continuation. While adultery, desertion, insanity and other statutory grounds each play their part in court as being the cause for
by religious dogma or social conventions.
divorce, it is not unlikely that there
It is naturally expected that a man
who opposes divorce because of its immorality and attempts to hide behind
are more deep-seated and influential causes which are never considered by the court.
the statement above quoted as a cause
This conclusion may be drawn both
