The Green Bag
644
III. The sole oflice of pleadings should be to give notice to the respective parties of the claims, defenses and cross-demands asserted by their adversaries; the pleader should not be held to state all the elements of claim defense or cross-demand, but merely to apprise his adversary fairly of what such claim, defense or cross'demand is to be.
IV. No cause, proceeding or appeal should be dismissed, rejected or thrown out solely because brought in or taken to the wrong court or wrong venue, but if there is one where it may be brought or prosecuted, it should be transferred thereto and go on there, all prior proceedings being saved. V. The equitable principle of wmplete disposition of the entire controversy between the parties should be extended to its full extent and applied to every type of proceeding. (1) The
courts
should
have
power and
it should be their duty in every sort of cause or proceeding to grant any relief or allow any defense or cross-demand which the facts shown and the substantive law may require. (2) No cause or proceeding should fail or be dismissed for want of necessary par ties or for non-joinder of parties, but pro vision should be made to bring them in. (3) Joinder of all parties proper to a complete disposition of the entire contro versy should be allowed in every sort of cause, and at every stage thereof, even though they are not all interested in the entire controversy. (4) Courts should have power in all pro ceedings to render such judgment against such parties before it as the case made requires in point of substantive law, to render difierent judgments against different parties or in favor of some and against others, whether on the same side of the cause or not, and to dismiss some and grant relief to or against others, imposing costs in case of misjoinder or unnecessary joinder upon the party or parties responsible therefor. VI. So far as possible, all questions of
fact should be disposed of finally upon one trial.—To give effect to this principle, four propositions may be suggested :— ' (1) Questions of law conclusive of the controversy or of some part thereof should be reserved and a verdict should be taken subject thereto, if the questions are at all doubtful, with power in ‘the court and in any other court to which the cause may be
taken on appeal, to enter judgment, either upon the verdict or upon the point reserved, as its judgment upon such point reserved may require. (2) In case a new trial is granted, it should
only be a new trial of the question or questions with respect to which the verdict or decision is found to be wrong, if separable. (3) Wherever a different measure of relief or measure of damages must be applied depending upon which view of a doubtful question of law is taken ultimately, the trial court should have power and it should be its duty to submit the cause to the jury upon each alternative and take its verdict thereon, with power in the trial court and in any court to which the cause may be taken, on appeal, to render judgment upon the one which its decision of the point of law involved may require. (4) Any court to which the cause is taken on appeal should have power to take addi tional evidence, by affidavit, deposition or reference to a master, for the purpose of
sustaining a verdict or judgment whenever the error complained of is lack of proof of some matter capable of proof by record or other incontrovertible evidence, defective certification or failure to lay the proper foundation for evidence which can, in fact, without involving some question for a jury, be shown to be competent. VII. No judgment should be set aside or new trial granted for error as to any matter not involving the substantive law or the facts, that is for error as to any matter of procedure,
unless it shall appear to the court that the error complained of has resulted in a miscar riage of justice. VIII. So far as they merely reiterate objections already made and ruled upon, exceptions should be abolished; it should be enough that due objection was interposed at the time the ruling in question was made. IX. An appeal should be treated as a motion for a rehearing or new trial or for vacation or modification of the order or judgment complained of, as the cause may require, before another tribunal. And c0r0llary,— Upon any appeal, in any sort of cause, the court should have full power to make what ever order the whole case and complete justice in accord with substantive law may require, without remand, unless a new trial becomes
necessary.
