Professor Gareis’s Introduction to the Science of Law terminological exactitude and with the orderliness of arrangement desired. The chief interest of the treatise, for the American student, is naturally found in its first part; the interest of the second part, as a scientific analysis of German law, hinges on the soundness of the doctrines found in the opening
portion and applied to practical use in
195
denominated peaceable regulation even though there be a possibility and even a necessity of the maintenance of legal order, in the extremest cases, by supreme force, as in the event of insur
rection or war.
It is therefore peaceable regu
lation, inasmuch as its means (i. e. commands
and prohibitions) are first of all peaceable, and as the establishment and maintenance of peace and tranquility are the conditions necessary to a development of human powers, and the progress of civilization.“
the second.
The first part of Gareis's work is re markably easy to read. There are no bristling idiosyncrasies of thought or lan guage, no statements which overtax credulity or invite serious controversy. The theory that the law is a system of
protected interests has already been made familiar to American students by the translations‘ from recent German legal literature which have already ap peared, and may be doubtless consid ered to have already made a place for
In only one respect does this defini tion invite criticism, and that is as to whether the law essentially implies peace able regulation. This is undoubtedly a much controverted question. I am in clined to think, however, that if Gareis's definition would have to be modified in this particular, the modification would
be only slight and would not go to the
legal science. A book based upon this theory, therefore, and executed with the
root of his definition. Jhering has strongly emphasized the nature of the law as a conflict of opposed interests, but it may be, and usually is, a peaceable conflict, in the sense that the contestants do not usually rely solely on physical force.
qualities of sanity and breadth of view
And in the case of a state laboring to
so conspicuous in Gareis, makes a direct
put down an insurrection, or a king striving to conquer a neighboring prov ince, obviously the restoration of peace, though peace in that case be synony mous with subjection, must precede the complete establishment of law.
itself as the orthodox doctrine of modern
appeal to the scientific mind and can scarcely fail to meet with an apprecia tive and sympathetic reception. Take, for example, Prof. Gareis's
luminous definition of law: —
Germany unquestionably leads the Law is the (means of) peaceable regulation of the external relations of persons and their social communities among themselves. It is a regulation (norma agendi), adjusting or stand ardizing through commands and prohibitions. its object is the adjustment of the external relations of mankind and social communities. It does not concern itself with internal activi ties, which belong to the domain of morals or religion. Its end and purpose is such a method of influencing these relations by commands and prohibitions that it may be justly called peace able regulation. It may involve, though not by necessity, measures of oo-ercion.B It is 8As’. to this point. the co-ercive nature of the law. Gareis is satisfactory where Korkunov seems too idealistic. Gareis puts the truth of the matter very clearly when he says: "Concrete compulsion
world in the philosophical science of jurisprudence, and Gareis is a good ex
ample of the modern scientific school which includes Jhering, Gierke, Brunner, Kohler, Merkel, and others. This school has taken the place formerly occupied
by the historical school in Germany, and will no doubt have an equally strong influence on Anglo-American legal thought. In England, the trend of general jurisprudence has been toward is not necessary as the object of a particular legal rule; but law nevertheless is excluded from those human activities where force is not possible." P. 37_ 'Pp. 29-30.
