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The Election of United States Senators protection of property are the under lying motives of all social organization. The guaranty of such is found in an upper, the creation and development of
personal rights and property in a lower House. No matter how a select council is
created, whether by appointment of the state executive or selection by the state
legislative authority, it must when necessary act as a check to popular encroachment upon fundamental or constitutional rights.
Caesar, after he
became dictator, exercised the partic ularly important right of nominating Senators, but, having the power of nomination, the ofiice of Senator be came dead as to him, for it was conceded
that its work did not apply to the Imperator——which meant the con centration and perpetuation of ofl‘icial power in his hands. I by no means assert that when Caesar absorbed the whole government it was a bad step for the Roman people; but we are not yet ready for an lmperator, although the present movement, if successful,
so that when one branch leans it is
instantly held up by another. The Senate is endowed with wisdom and strength to resist all innovations of fundamental rights. It is just and necessary, therefore, that the power of
appointment of Senators should be lifted out of the chaos and tumult of popular election and lodged in a different body. The member of the House represents the people of a small district, and of the Senate the whole state, and
all of the people therein.
If the people
are neglectful or undiscriminating in the election of representatives to the legislatures, they will be equally so in their choice of
Senators.
Cannot
the
people
trust
themselves to exercise the same care in choosing their state legislators as
they would in the selection of Senators? The alleged reform is then nothing less than a stab at the people themselves —at their intelligence and discrimina tion. This argument has never been, and never can be answered. Besides,
the deprivation of the legislatures of the power to elect Senators would be a direct and powerful blow at the morale of these
will be a large advance in that direction. But whether we have a Caesar in the
bodies. It would be in effect the destruc
Executive, or whether we have a Caesar in the Congress separate or united, con
tion of their usefulness. It is an un founded and undiscriminating assault
centrating and perpetuating all power in its hands, either is equally distasteful to our political education and incon gruous in our free institutions. No government can exist where the people exercise
capricious
power
any
more
than one can exist where the Executive is a despot.
JOIN A POPULAR EXECUTIVE
WITH A POPULAR LEGISLATIVE BODY, FOR THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT IS INVOLVED IN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CoN STITUTION, AND WHAT REMAINS or THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED BY THE CoN STITUTION?
The
best
government
is
that in which the checks and balances are properly and equally regulated—
upon forty-eight legislative bodies en bloc.
It is argued that the state legis
latures often have “deadlocks" and that their time is frequently misapplied or wasted in an effort to elect a Senator,
and that in the interim the state loses representation in the United States Senate. With great respect, this is a matter for
the
individual
states
to
settle. It is purely a question of internal policy. Political manhood, state politics, religion or economy may be involved and the internal strife may be carried on to settle a great principle. It may be thoughtful and patriotic for the United States Senate to suggest to a state thus
