The Editor's Bag THE PANAMA CANAL AND NA TIONAL SECURITY THE Monroe Doctrine has now an uncertain status in the realm of international law. While it cannot be said to have been expressly repudiated by the Powers, and it would therefore be erroneous to declare it absolutely without validity, neither can it be said to have received that sanction of gen eral assent from which all principles of international law derive their force and authority. This indefinite condition cannot con tinue forever. Questions must arise in volving the interpretation of the Mon roe Doctrine, and even though such questions fail to reach the Hague tri bunal and are settled by diplomacy, the acquiesence of other nations, if it is accorded, cannot fail to strengthen the Doctrine in its purely juridical aspect in a manner that will make it more binding upon the Powers. It is thus within the bounds of possibility that the Monroe Doctrine may come to be recognized as a valid rule of inter national equity long before it is formu lated by treaty or otherwise as a definite principle of law. The adoption of the Monroe Doctrine by general consent will depend chiefly upon the reasonableness of the inter pretation the United States places upon it. Originally designed to enable this country to avoid entanglement or col lision with European powers, and to justify measures of national security
rather than of aggression, a defensive rather than an offensive Doctrine, it can consistently be interpreted only in a liberal spirit, with full recognition of the rights of other nations. Only under this liberal interpretation can we hope to realize the benefits contemplated by the statesmen who formulated the Doctrine. For a less reasonable and liberal inter pretation would compel a policy which could be successfully maintained only by means of those costly armaments and burdensome European alliances which the Doctrine sought to avoid. The opening of the Panama canal cannot fail to bring up questions of the greatest importance, on the wise solu tion of which will depend the peace of the world and in which the existence of the Monroe Doctrine itself may be involved. Those who favor too rigor ous a construction of the Doctrine may easily precipitate a situation leading to its being challenged by the leading Powers, and challenged successfully. It is only too easy for statesmen impelled by an inordinate zeal to promote Ameri can commerce, to force our country to take up a position entailing the mainte nance of costly armaments and offering a constant menace to our national wellbeing. On the contrary a moderate application of the Doctrine, in harmony with the spirit of its framers cannot fail to command the approval of other nations and to strengthen not only the Doctrine itself, but through it our own position as a world power. By the Hay-Pauncefote treaty we
