Neo-Hegelianism in Jurisprudence science and toward empirical reality is influenced by the modern spirit; he deems the study of concrete evidence, such as that of economics for instance, of great importance. In the present work he treats the natural world as something more than the manifestation or emanation of pure ideas. Yet the empirical world is not alone to be con sidered. There is also the world of the will. The workings of the will are not to be explained by natural law. The positions of vitalism and voluntarism are assumed, in opposition to those of the mechanical theory and phenomenalism. Berolzheimer's philosophy is a dualistic voluntarism, diverging from monistic naturalism on one hand, and from monistic idealism on the other. The reader will be able to judge from what follows to what extent Berolzheimer's theory, seemingly at variance with the Hegelian tendency, actually conforms to it. While Berolzheimer disavows the Hegelian dialectical treatment of ethical progress as the emanation of an abstract ideological movement,3 he does not rest ethical development on the foundation of objective dynamic processes. With Hegel the absolutely rational and moral will is free; the will in its lower stages of development is free only in itself, be cause instincts and direct impulses form determining motives.4 But this acknowl edgment of the determining effect of instinct recognizes no objective process of causation, but only a dialectical pro cess of pure thought.5 Berolzheimer does not accept the Hegelian view of the morally free will of absolute reason, being concerned, instead, with the will as actually expressed in historical prog ress. Emotional conditions are decisive > p. 231. < Pp. 217-8. » P. 220.
factors.6 Yet the individual is not to be considered fatalistically, for "his spon taneity and initiative are to be taken into consideration," as well as his status as a member of society; his "position and efficiency as an individual" make possible a view of the individual as the active director of forces of evolution to the realization of an objective goal of endeavor.7 The supposition that the moral progress proceeds according to natural laws "would lead to fatalism, resignation, the acknowledgment of human impotence in the presence of mighty forces of nature; in which case it is futile to enlarge upon what may be ethically desirable."8 Emotional condi tions, if decisive factors, lie outside the realm of dynamic forces. Berolzheimer thus rejects the positions of determin ism and naturalism. II A few of the more salient features of this "Neo-Hegelian" doctrine may be briefly pointed out: (1) It implies acceptance of the eco nomic interpretation of history, but the subordination of this interpretation to the cultural interpretation, and an "idealistic" view of economic institu tions in contrast to the "materialism" of a purely mechanical view of economic forces. (2) It measures the life of the past by contemporary standards, and is a formu lation of the spirit of modern democracy. (3) The ideal law for existing human society cannot be deduced by processes of empirical reasoning, but problems of legislation are to be met only by the spontaneous activity of a culture which seeks expression in a law embodying its own freely determined purpose. 6 Pp. 217-8, 350. 7 Pp. xlii-xliii, 368-9, 427. 8 P. 363.