Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 25.pdf/367

This page needs to be proofread.


The Green Bag

Law as to Monopoly of Trade." By S. S. Gregory. "Industrial 11 and Michigan commercial Law Review freedom572has(June). made and developed our domestic trade to its present enormous proportions. Should its very great ness and prosperity suggest wanton and lawless aggression upon society, these manifestations may be properly repressed and punished; but it ought not to be put in legislative shackles nor compelled to submit to the control of admin istrative leading strings." "The Disintegration of the Tobacco Com bination." By A. C. Muhse. Political Science Quarterly, v. 28, p. 249 (June). "The disintegration of the tobacco combina tion under the Sherman law is an accomplished fact. . . . "The economic soundness of dissolution pro ceedings against monopolistic combinations must be determined by their ultimate results." It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the new status of the tobacco business will prove more acceptable than the old. Negligence. See Damages. New Trials. "Trial by Jury in United States Courts." By J. L. Thorndike. 26 Harvard Law Review 732 (June). Discussing Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co. (25 Green Bag 274) "The decision of the majority of the court is a public misfortune, because it destroys a simple means of enforcing, without the expense, delay, and uncertainty of a new trial, a right to which the decision shows that a party was entitled at the trial. There is, however, a way in which the consequences of the decision may be miti gated." "The History and Development of the Motion for New Trial and in Arrest of Judgment." By Morrell De Reign. 47 American Law Review 377 (May-June). "It would seem that the only case in which there is anything for which the motion in arrest is especially applicable, is the case where there is a defect in form in the verdict of the jury. In all other cases there is nothing to be gained by it which could not be secured by the writ of error after judgment, or by a general demurrer before trial." Perpetuities. "General Testamentary Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities." By John Chipman Gray. 26 Harvard Law Review 720 (June). Prof. Gray states wherein he is unable to agree with Mr. Kales' views. Procedure. "Respect for the Law." By Frank L. Fish. 47 American Law Review 365 (May-June). "It is the opinion of good students of the subject under discussion that as a remedy for the law's delay, increased power should be given to the judges. It is probably safe to say that

the power of a judge in the trial of jury cases is not so great as it formerly was. In many of our states laws have been enacted limiting the power of the judges and fixing fast and hard rules for their guidance, so that they have become practically moderators in the forum over which they preside, while the battle rages around powerful and learned counsel upon whose wit and eloquence and legal ability the trial hinges." See New Trials. Proof. "The Problem of Proof." By Prof. John H. Wigmore. 8 Illinois Law Review 77 (June). The book of which this is the final chapter will be awaited with great interest. Dean Wigmore's latest work, shortly to appear, is to be entitled "The Principles of Judicial Proof, as Contained in Logic, Psychology, and General Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials." It is stated in a footnote that the chapter here published represents the objective to which the prior portions are directed. This objective is "a scientific understanding of the principles of what may be called 'natural' proof," and the development of an apparatus which may be of service in collating a mass of evidence and in determining its net ultimate effect on beliefs. "If we do not begin to develop a science of proof, history will repeat itself, and we shall find our selves in the present plight of Continental Europe," where for a century past judicial trials have been carried on "by uncomprehended, unguided, and therefore unsafe mental processes." A scheme for analysis of the probative effect of a large mass of evidence is described, the method proposed being offered tentatively rather than in the belief that it is absolutely perfect. At first sight, the strange symbols employed seem recondite and mystifying, but on closer examination they arc seen to be by no means hard to master. These symbols furnish a notation by means of which, first, the various types of evidence, e.g., testimonial, circumstantial, and judicially noticed, may be differentiated; secondly, the logical connection between individual bits of evidence may be graphically indicated by lines connecting the symbols; and thirdly, the degree of credit or doubt given to a piece of evidence may be notated by auxiliary signs. The notation thus created may be used in the concrete operation of charting the evidence presented by either prosecution or defense in any judicial trial. Specimen charts arc given by way of illustration. One of the principal justifications of the scheme is the object of enabling "all the data to be lifted into the consciousness at once." Even though the chart end in an interrogation, one feels that every particle of evidence has been subjected to analysis and fitted into its proper place in the architectural plan. We refrain from criticism of this scheme until Professor Wigmore's book has appeared and a fuller statement of his views is at hand. Three questions, however, suggest themselves, which we do not now undertake to answer: (1) Can the scheme be of practical use? (2) does it afford a substantially accurate test of the degree of probability? (3) if modified so as to provide