of mind and body the better to cope with these necessities. Intelligence and will supply by their own effort some of the conditions upon which the transition from the “might be” to the “is” hangs. That is what we mean when we say retrospectively that the impossible has been achieved. Among the most poignant tragedies of history are those in which men have cried “impossible” too soon, and for want of vision have summoned up energies sufficient to win the day—too late. The virtues and vices of men are more than catalytic agents. They can be and have been powerful historical forces, a fact which gainsays no intelligent conception of social determinism.
Moral responsibility in history consists in being aware of the relevant ifs and might-bes in the present, and choosing between alternatives in the light of predictable consequences. We may lose even after we have chosen intelligently and fought bravely. In that case regret is always vain, and resignation, without capitulation to the ideals of the enemy, is the better part of wisdom, until a new opportunity supervenes. But intelligence and sustained courage will win much more often than drift and fitful bursts of effort. If there is any ethical imperative valid for all historical periods it is awareness and action.
These reflections have a particular bearing on our own historical present. Wherever we look at the world to-day, we can observe the fateful consequences of the lost chances of yester-day. The international labour and socialist movement lost its chance in August, 1914, to stop a world war that, as was predicted then, would breed more terrible wars. Kerensky and the democratic socialist bloc lost the chance to put into effect the official but unannounced programme of his own party which, as Chernov has revealed, called for cessation of war, the distribution of land to the peasants, and other measures that the Bolsheviks advocated as preparatory to imposing their ruthless minority dictatorship. The leading party of the Weimar Republic lost its chance to break up the monarchist centres of reaction without whose help Hitler might never have come to power. The governments of western Europe and the United States lost their chance to help the legally recognized Spanish state against invasion by Mussolini and Hitler and win an active ally on the Continent instead of a hostile neutral, in the inescapable showdown with Fascism.
The consequences of a lost chance rarely close the doors to future choice. But they narrow them to alternatives that are all
