time—a counsel echoed by Saint-Beuve a century ago—would to-day most certainly arouse the suspicions of the secret police. This not only marks the distance which Europe has come from the absolutions of yesterday; it is a sign that, except for the leader and his entourage, everyone has lost his private life without acquiring a public one.
In democratic countries like England and America—democratic because the leadership is still largely responsible to representative bodies, and subject to vigorous criticism by rank and file citizens—the area and power of executive authority have been enormously expanded. This is in part a consequence of the trend toward State capitalism in their economies; in part a consequence of the necessity of total defence in the struggle for survival against totalitarian aggression. But whatever the reason, the facts are unmistakable and are becoming plainer and plainer every day. With the possible exception of the field of foreign policy, the discretionary powers of the American President and the British Cabinet Ministers in the last few years surpass any democratic forebears.
Where so few can apparently decide so much, it is not surprising that interest in the historical significance of outstanding individuals should be strong. It does not require theoretic sophistication to realise that everyone has a practical stake of the most concrete kind in whatever leadership exists. Personal views and virtues in the political high command may spell public disaster or welfare. For once, at least, Mr. Everyman’s moral appraisal of those in high places—if only he can keep it above the plane of village gossip—has historical relevance and justification.
The fundamental logic of the situation, to which we shall often recur, that gives intelligent point to contemporary interest in our theme, is this: Either the main line of historical action and social development is literally inescapable or it is not. If it is, any existing leadership is a completely subsidiary element in determining the main historical pattern of to-day and to-morrow. If it is not inescapable, the question almost asks itself: to what extent is the character of a given leadership casually and, since men are involved, morally responsible for our historical position and future? As we shall see, those who do speak of the inescapability of a specific historical future either belie their words by their actions as well as by other words, or else they compound their belief in an inescapable future with another
