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the hero in history

Teclmical innovations do not eliminate alternatives of choice and action. They may narrow the alternatives by ruling out some possibilities; they may be employed to carry out a decision once the alternative is chosen. They do not cause wars or peace, social revolutions—or even changes of ministry. Finally, it must not be overlooked that among the roster of the great names of science are individuals whose scientific theories have had no important technological consequences. The history of technology, compared to the history of pure science, from which it can be distinguished (but not separated) is a history of lesser men, of Fords and Edisons who achieve their prominence because they score first in a race in which so many men compete that no one man seems indispensable for finishing the race. Someone nearly always wins.

The issue before us is located in a different field in which the arts and sciences play a subordinate role. The question is whether the vast political, social, and economic changes which mark off historical periods, or whether the events that are turning points in historical development, are ever attributable to the work of uniquely gifted or uniquely situated personalities. If there are such uniquely gifted or outstanding personalities, what conjuncture of circumstances must arise before they can exercise their influence? Or are they able to play their parts at any time? Detailed inquiries of a specific kind along these lines are rare, but some have been made. We shall presently turn to the most patient and thoroughgoing of them. The problem here is much more difficult than in the fields already canvassed, for all sorts of considerations are confused in defining the “historical hero” as distinct from the heroes of the arts and sciences. Evaluations of historical significance are much more troubled by controversial passions. Robert Ingersoll and H. G. Wells refuse to regard Napoleon as a hero because they do not approve of him.[1] There is certainly room in history for moral judgments, but they do not enter in determining the actual effects of any individual on human affairs. We may abominate Hitler precisely because

  1. Typical of this attitude is H. G. Wells’s characterization of Napoleon.

    “Failing (a noble imagination) Napoleon could do no more than strut upon this great mountain of opportunity like a cockerel on a dunghill. The figure he makes in history is one of almost incredible self-conceit, of vanity, greed, and cunning, of callous contempt and disregard of all who trusted him, and of a grandiose aping of Cæsar, Alexander, and Charlemagne which would be purely comic if it were not caked over with human blood.” The Outline of History, pp. 98–9, Star edition. New York, 1929.