Since history is made by men and not by bloodless abstractions, the obstacles that stand in the way of this progressive expansion of productive forces must be cleared by men. The greater the task, the greater is the experienced need for change; the greater the need, the greater is the man who necessarily emerges to give leadership to the struggle for change. The great man of thought is he who prepares the minds of men for the revolutionary social changes that, unknown to them, are already on their way. The great man of action is the organizer of the struggle between the classes that stand to gain or lose by revolution. Who the great man will be we do not know; that he will be found whenever he is needed is certain. What his particular ideas and actions will be we cannot tell; that, no matter what they are, their consequences will help liberate the productive forces and gratify the needs of society for a new system of social relations, is assured. In Engels’ own words:
That a certain particular man, and no other, emerges at a definite time in a given country is naturally a pure chance. But even if we eliminate him there is always a need for a substitute, and the substitute is found tant bien que mal; in the long run he is sure to be found. That Napoleon—this particular Corsican—should have been the military dictator made necessary by the exhausting wars of the French Republic—that was a matter of chance. But in default of a Napoleon, another would have filled his place, that is established by the fact that whenever a man was necessary, he has always been found: Cæsar, Augustus, Cromwell. (Letter to Starkenberg.)
The difficulties in this position are so obvious that it is hard to explain its widespread acceptance among those who pride themselves on their allegiance to scientific method. Engels tells us that a great man is a necessary response to a social need for him: But how do we know that there is a social need for him? Surely not after the event! That would be viciously circular. If we can recognize the need for a great man before he appears, then, in the face of the history of wars, revolutions, class struggles, and momentous social problems, it would be no exaggeration to say that there is always a need for great men. But where are they? On Engels’ assumption that a great man is a necessary response to a social need, he should always be present. History would still be a domain of economic necessity, but the mode of its assertion would always be through great men. Yet Engels
