more conciliatory towards England. The whole relation
of the King of Prussia to our Revolutionary War
is hardly worth the attention that has been bestowed
on it. It would appear that Frederick, owing to his
dislike for the British, and on grounds of general policy,
gave orders to his ministers to treat the American
agents, Arthur and William Lee, with politeness, though
he was prevented by his political judgment from
according them the smallest advantage. “I propose,”
wrote he to his brother Henry, on June 17th, 1777,
“to procrastinate in these negotiations, and to go over
to the side on which fortune shall declare herself.”[1]
Seeing, however, in the autumn of 1777, a good
opportunity to vent his spite against the English, to
express his contempt for what he considered a disgraceful
business, to diminish the drain of men from
Germany, and, perhaps, to do a good turn to the Americans,
with whom he sympathized as the enemies of his
enemies, he adopted the measures above described.
It is possible that Frederick was also influenced by a
personal dislike for “Monsieur his Nephew,” who had
long before embraced the Austrian side in German
politics.
As for the importance to America of the hinderance thus thrown in the way of the mercenary princes, it seems to me that Kapp overrates it. It may possibly have been the want of the reinforcements thus delayed and the uncertainty of obtaining more men in the future that prevented Sir William Howe from destroying Washington's army at Valley Forge, and completely stamping out the rebellion. But such a con-
- ↑ “Œuvres Frédéric le Grand,” vol. xxvi. p. 393.
