some time unaware of the place to which he had been conveyed.
As Professor Tomek writes, our information concerning this civic revolution is very scant, and it is hardly necessary to point out how very improbable some parts of the generally accepted account appear. It is scarcely imaginable that Korybutovič, whom his enemies describe as a traitor and intriguer, and who had at any rate much experience of the political life in Bohemia and other Slavic countries, should have entrusted two members of his household with a weighty political mission without informing his numerous and powerful allies among the Utraquist nobility of his intentions. Yet none of these allies were ready to come to his aid, and Korybutovič himself was obviously taken by surprise when suddenly attacked in his dwelling. In the almost entire absence of trustworthy evidence, it may be at least conjectured that the coup d’état of April 17 was not a plot of Prince Korybutovič, but a plot against him. This view is confirmed by the fact that almost immediately after the imprisonment of Korybutovič Rozvoda and Svojše obtained important offices under the new municipality of Prague. As far as we are able to judge, public opinion disapproved of this sudden outrage inflicted on one who had proved himself a true friend of Bohemia. I have already quoted on this subject passages from the contemporary chroniclers and from a ballad of the period. The author of this ballad probably expressed the general opinion at the time when he wrote:
“Thus did they [the enemies of Korybutovič] act.
They set us at variance with the whole world.
We then lost [the help of] Poland,
Whence we formerly received aid.
They [the enemies of Korybutovič] did not heed this;
They took good care of themselves in Prague.”
As the last lines of the ballad which I have quoted indicate, great changes took place in the distribution of the municipal dignities in Prague, and the principal offices were given to
