ordered, then, an assault for the 12th. The scheme had been drawn up by Greathed, Maunsell, and Chesney of the engineers, and by Hodson, afterwards known as 'Hodson of Hodson's Horse,' an officer of great intrepidity. It had been arranged that the troops told off for the attack should assemble between one and two in the morning, and then, undercover of the darkness, should proceed noiselessly to the gates, blow them open, and effect an entrance. At the appointed time and place all the troops were assembled, with the exception of 300 of the 1st Europeans, to be commanded by Brigadier Graves. These never came, and in consequence the enterprise was abandoned. Graves had received no written orders, and as the verbal notice he received would have involved leaving the Flagstaff picket in the hands of natives, he declined to act upon it. It was fortunate he did so, for after events proved that, even had the gates been carried, the force was not nearly strong enough to hold Dehlí. A repulse would possibly have involved the destruction of the besieging force, and the evil consequences of this to British authority in India it is difficult to over-estimate.
On the 14th June General Reed, the senior divisional commander, arrived on the ridge to assume command. For the moment, however, on account of his health, he did not supersede Barnard. That officer continued to direct the operations till his death. In Reed's tent the question of a coup-de-main was discussed for several days. The civilian who was consulted, Mr Hervey Greathed, brother of the engineer of the same name, was in favour of adopting a revised plan drawn up by his brother, to be put into execution without delay. But all the senior soldiers, Barnard, Archdale Wilson, and Reed were against it. It is fair to add that they did not object to the plan itself so much as to the moment of executing it. They
