17.
in dispute, that when the respondent was sentenced "there would have been good reason to assume … that the Attorney would be so satisfied in relation to the activities of the [respondent]".[1] Accordingly, when the respondent was sentenced, it was very likely that s 19ALB(1) would apply to him. Section 19ALB(1) provides:
"Despite any law of the Commonwealth, the Attorney-General must not make a parole order in relation to a person covered by subsection (2) unless the Attorney-General is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist to justify making a parole order."
48 Section 19AL(1) of the Crimes Act is a "law of the Commonwealth" despite which s 19ALB(1) operates. Section 19AL(1) provides that:
"The Attorney-General must, before the end of a non-parole period fixed for one or more federal sentences imposed on a person, either make, or refuse to make, an order directing that the person be released from prison on parole (a parole order)."
49 Section 19ALA(1) specifies matters "that are known to the Attorney-General and relevant to the decision" to which the Attorney-General may have regard in making a decision under s 19AL. By s 19ALA(2), s 19ALA(1) does not limit the matters that the Attorney-General may consider in making a decision under s 19AL.
50 By s 19AB(1), a sentencing court is required to fix a single non-parole period in respect of a federal sentence of imprisonment as specified, unless satisfied that a non-parole period is not appropriate in accordance with s 19AB(3).
Consideration
51 Whether a sentencing judge is bound to consider the potential operation of s 19ALB on a person being sentenced to a term of imprisonment involves the proper construction of the provisions of Pt IB of the Crimes Act. If the allegedly relevant factor is not expressly stated to be relevant (as in this case), its relevance is to be determined "by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act".[2] Further, if "a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the
