and creed, but would do so at the sword's point. Individual Mohammedans may, like individual Romanists, be and are exceptions to this statement, and better than their training; but I speak of the system and of the general action—and here are its terrible illustrations in the hour of its opportunity.
Our fate evidently hung upon that of Delhi. If that city fell, we should probably be saved; if not, we must expect the worst, and that soon. But what could less than seven thousand soldiers and a few Sikh and Ghoorka allies do, and that in the open air and in the hottest season of the India year, against a strongly-fortified city, behind whose walls from forty to sixty thousand Sepoys fought! The Commander-in-chief of the Sepoys was Bukt Khan, an acquaintance of my own, for he was from Bareilly, and was Subadar of Artillery under our friend Major Kirby. When I have sat with the Major in the cool of the evening, and seen this sleek Sepoy come in, with such profound courtesy to us both, to deliver his daily report, how little I could have imagined the part he would yet, and so soon, play behind the walls of Delhi, with the Major's coat and cocked hat upon him, and his sword by his side!
Even though that handful of Englishmen could not take the city till they obtained more assistance, it was of immense benefit to us and to India that they held so many Sepoys fast there. The rebels came out in force on the 23d of June, and fought for thirteen hours. Their “astrologers” had declared that “unless they should beat the English army on that day” (the anniversary and centenary of the battle of Plassey, the most important action of the English in India) “the British would hold the country forever.” Hence the force and numbers with which they attacked, and the perseverance with which they kept up the contest. They were repulsed, however, leaving, as usual, the English masters of the field. They were much discouraged at their failure. Their loss on that day was, after all, but small—not over 500; their mode of fighting accounts for this. When they can choose their own ground and method they are very averse to any thing like “close quarters,” and much like the long-shot mode of warfare. This, and lurking
