Page:The Lessons of the German Events (1924).djvu/24

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against the Communist Party, and by playing off the unemployed against the employed. The power of the State and militarism which Fascism has at its disposal, have enabled it to force the ten-hour day upon the proletariat with little resistance. Defensive fights of any importance began only in January. In spite of the reports of the resistance of the workers to the lengthening of the working day, it must be said that the proletariat is in such a state of depression that it accepted the ten-hour day without a fight. The attempts of the Communists to organise resistance against the ten-hour day have met with no great practical results.

What is the reason? In this present economic crisis the proletariat is split. The unemployed is in such a situation that they must fight or be crushed, and their fight will be a light of despair if the workers leave them in the lurch. There are over three million unemployed in Germany, and they are in such a situation that they must fight. Alone they have no chance of victory. What is the position of the other sections of the working class? There are three million short-time workers in Germany. Depression prevails among the full-time workers also for they are afraid of becoming unemployed or short-time workers. Among the full-time workers and the short-time workers there are sections who, if it were a question of at once entering upon a decisive struggle, weapon in hand, would be prepared for it, but who hesitate to undertake the necessary preliminary small fights, demonstrations, strikes, &c. This is a fact we have to face boldly. If the bourgeoisie succeeds in extending the breach between the unemployed and the full-time workers and short-time workers, it will gain for itself a longer breathing space. This, of course, depends upon the possibility of restoring a temporary economic balance.

Such are the prospects. Lamentations are useless. All the conditions exist to permit us shortly, if we are able, to rally the masses again and to fight. If the Party, as a result of the October defeat, and in the process of self-examination, reaches a crisis, if it is split, then we have lost five years of work. The October defeat was a severe defeat. It has disintegrated the Social-Democrats as never before. The Social-Democrats are faced with a split. This means that if we are not capable of assimilating this section of the working class, a new centrist party will arise. If we cannot assimilate it, if the new party manages to exist more than half-a-year, if we pursue a policy of phrases, as the opposition does, we shall become a sect. We shall then have a new centrist party which will grow not only from elements split off from the Social-Democrats, but also from losses from the Communist Party. This will mean the defeat of the German Revolution for many years, and what is more, the defeat of the world revolution. It is therefore a question of the greatest importance. In spite of the October defeat, there is no need for pessimism. Never before was the activity of the German party of such great importance as it is at the present moment.

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