if the Zeigner people really desired to fight the Fascists and arm 50,000 to 60,000 workers.
(Varski: It was a great mistake.)
The representative of the German Party gave us this figure, 50,000 to 60,000. (Pieck: The Party was not informed of these conditions.)
This telegram was decided on in the presence of three German and three Russian comrades.
However, how did we present the situation to ourselves? As an episode in the civil war, and we informed you of this in the text.
I want, thirdly, to make another quotation on the question of our attitude to the Left Social-Democracy and towards the Social-Democracy as a whole. "In the presence of the German representatives, we resolved that we have to conduct the campaign, not only without the Left Social-Democracy, but even against it."
These documents are sufficient to recall to your minds what the Executive had decided.
These documents should also refresh your memories, and you will understand how the Executive was placed, and that the comrades had agreed to its position.
(Brandler: I did not agree to the telegram.)
Comrades, I must admit that I and the other comrades bear most of the responsibility for the entry into the Saxony Government. Brandler somewhat hesitated on this, He said "I do not know whether the situation is ripe for it," but he agreed. I do not wish to shirk any responsibility. It was the general view, and decided upon with you after consultation with the French, with the Polish, and with the Czecho-Slovak Parties, we said, if it was really a question of weeks we must utilise this in the event of civil war.
Well, this was the general view.
Now, comrades, how was it carried out? That is the most important question. Take Saxony. Comrade Remmele said yesterday: "Is it so important to bring up now about the Ministers being too late? Is not this opportunism? What can we expect from Minister?"
What is right in this statement? Of course, the most important is what the masses do. But for us, it is a symptom of wrong tendencies in the Party. The main question is, of course, why the civil war did not come, and why the masses could not be mobilised. You must understand, however, why we place so much importance upon the speeches of the Communist ministers: because it was a Ssmptom of the wrong tendency in our Party. Who were the minister ? Our leading and best comrades. Brandler, Heckert, Boettcher. For us, their speeches were a symptom of decay.
(Thälmann: Quite true.)
Compare the ideas contained in our telegram with the style
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