usually overlooked. In the long peace which followed the overthrow of the first Napoleon military efficiency suffered. The rise of the third Napoleon threw England into a series of panics, and preparations were made for the 'inevitable war' with France which never happened. The Whig government of Lord John Russell was defeated in 1852 because the country disliked its plan of reviving the local militia, enrolled by ballot or partial compulsion. The Derby administration which followed met the popular preference by providing for volunteer enlistment with the ballot held in reserve. Seven years later the fear of French invasion revived. The government wished to strengthen the regular naval and military forces and dotted the coasts with Martello towers, but the people had other plans, and against its will and the weight of professional advice, the government had to give its sanction to the enrolment of corps of volunteers as the chief means of meeting the danger.
In Canada and the other North American colonies a fairly efficient military system had been set up just before the war of 1812 broke out, and had passed well through the ordeal that followed. It provided for universal liability to service, with periodical mustering, but practically no training in time of peace. It was essentially a recruiting scheme, the training of the men and the staff work in general being left to the regular forces. After the war the system fell into decay; the militia forces became the target of derision, and the annual muster-day a farce—in 1848 only six men presented themselves in Toronto—or else an occasion of drunken revelry. In 1853 the whole appropriation of the provincial legislature for military purposes was only two thousand pounds currency.
The provincial government was now awakening to the need of action. The appointment of a commission by the MacNab-Morin government in 1854 led next year to the
