Page:The Limits of Evolution (1904).djvu/110

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THE LIMITS OF EVOLUTION
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that constitutes the core of intelligence, another component. This other component, which Kant named “sensation,” to mark the fact that it expresses something insufficient in us, something which must be supplemented to us by reception from what is not ourselves, is best interpreted as a limit which points to the coöperation[1] of some other noumenal being with men and other conscious centres. But when once the conditioning relation is shown to exist from man toward Nature, as the scene of evolution, instead of from Nature toward man; when once it is seen — as Huxley, the protagonist of evolution, at last came so clearly, if so unawares, to imply[2] — that in Conscience at least, the ideal of Righteousness, man has that which no cosmic process can possibly account for, but to which, rather, the cosmic process presents an aspect of unmistakable antagonism, then our way will come open to determine the coöperating Noumenon, the Supreme Reality, as also having this higher human nature, as having it in its ideal perfection, and

  1. The reader should beware not to interpret these terms “reception” and “coöperation” literally, that is, in the light of ordinary natural or efficient causation only, as it is our bad uncritical habit to do. Their genuine interpretation must be by means of final cause. But see the essay on “The Harmony of Determinism and Freedom,” pp. 332-351.
  2. See his Romanes Lecture on “Evolution and Ethics,” in his Collected Essays, vol. ix; especially pp. 79-84, and Note 20. In these pages and in this Note, their great author holds out for the inclusion of Conscience, in some vague way, in the evolutional process as a whole; but he has demonstrated an antagonism that is fatal to the hypothesis.