Page:The Limits of Evolution (1904).djvu/208

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LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY
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logically impossible by it. Will, like cognition, Lange holds to be merely phenomenon; we cannot, then, aver with Kant that we must be free, but only that we must think ourselves free.

But with this granted, Kant’s way of grounding ethics comes to an end, and we must seek, says Lange, to frame a right world-view by consistently carrying out our only initial certainty. We must return to the problem of the source and limits of cognition, where, fortunately, we can assume an a priori organisation as having been established by Kant. The elements, too, that Kant assigned to this organisation — Space, Time, Cause, and the rest — all belong there. But Kant's attempt to settle a priori the exact number of such forms was necessarily futile: there is no way to determine what the contents of our a priori endowment are except induction. Besides, the gradual progress of the natural sciences, particularly the modern physiology of the senses (in which the primary sensations — light, colour, heat, sound, taste, odour, etc. — have all been reduced to modes of motion), points clearly to the probable omission of an essential form from Kant’s list: Motion should take its place among the a priori forms of sense.

Indeed, one principal aim of any attempt at a reconstruction of the Critique of Pure Reason should be to bring its doctrine into thorough accord with