Page:The Limits of Evolution (1904).djvu/220

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LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY
159

doubt, and with a persistency in the recurrence of its wanderings that is even too fatal, but delirium still. In the wan light of “critical” thinking —

We are such stuff
As dreams are made of, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.

It is no proper refutation of a theory, however, to show its evil practical results; the very question in our day is, Whether our being is not compact of evil? It is a just retort upon all such ethical reproaches to say, “Yes, our fate is heavy and our prospects are desperate; but what does that do toward disproving the fact?” It is true enough that Lange's ethical structure breaks down, and that the gap between it and his theory is a discredit to his logic, but his “critical” view is not to be displaced except by strictly theoretical means. His procedure must be forced to expose contradictions, or else both the procedure and its results must be accepted. But should it now prove to be self-contradictory, it will annul itself and its assumed principle. That such a contradiction is really involved in it, we may convince ourselves by the considerations which follow.


IV

Lange’s principle is, that the a priori nature of our cognition prohibits us from assuming that we can