that astronomy has to do with. But whether portions of the universe, however large they may be, are quasi-Euclidean, is a wholly different question. We can make this clear by using an example from the theory of surfaces which we have employed many times. If a portion of a surface is observed by the eye to be practically plane, it does not at all follow that the whole surface has the form of a plane; the surface might just as well be a sphere, for example, of sufficiently large radius. The question as to whether the universe as a whole is non-Euclidean was much discussed from the geometrical point of view before the development of the theory of relativity. But with the theory of relativity, this problem has entered upon a new stage, for according to this theory the geometrical properties of bodies are not independent, but depend upon the distribution of masses.
If the universe were quasi-Euclidean, then Mach was wholly wrong in his thought that inertia, as well as gravitation, depends upon a kind of mutual action between bodies. For in this case, with a suitably selected system of co-ordinates, the would be constant at infinity, as they are in the special theory of relativity, while within finite regions the would differ from these constant values by small amounts only, with a suitable choice of co-ordinates, as a result of the influence of the masses in finite regions. The physical properties of space would not then be wholly independent, that is, uninfluenced by matter, but in the main they would be, and only in small measure, conditioned by matter. Such a dualistic conception is even in itself not satisfactory; there are,
