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the Ukraine as a fertile soil for her clerical imperialism. (Szeptycki’s memorandum.)
41. Not only the Ukraine but Poland and the other small nations in the East need the support of a strong Russia; otherwise they easily, while apparently independent, could come under the deciding economic and even political control of Germany. It will be a matter of great importance how far these nations in the East will manage to agree among themselves (the relations between the Ukrainians and the Poles, between the Poles and the Lithuanians, and between the Lithuanians and the Letts).
The relation of Germany to Russia is the relation of Prussia to tsarism; we have already stated that Prussian theocratism had been at one with Russian theocratism. Austria joined Prussia and Russia (the Holy Alliance,—the influence of Metternich’s system in Russia and Prussia—the protection given to the Habsburgs in 1848–49 by Nicholas I.—the Alliance of the three Emperors), but the old antagonism of Rome and Byzantium and the Jesuitic policy of Vienna in the Balkans brought about the crisis, and, in the end, the prospect of booty (territory) changed the Russophile policy of Bismarck and Treitschke.
The Pangermans, partly under the influence of Baltic politicians (Schiemann, Rohrbach, and others) drove official Prussia against Russia; the adherents of the Bismarckian tradition proved to be the weaker. Emperor William himself, together with Bethman-Hollweg, at the beginning of the war, accused Russia of being the principal cause of it, and denounced her imperialistic Panslavism—an extremely onesided and incorrect explanation.
Germany’s relations to Russia have been changed by the new orientation of world politics, as they were extended into Asia and Africa. Here Germany came into conflict not only with Russia but also with England and France, the principal Asiatic Powers. That brought about the understanding of Russia with England. The new German world politics is substantially the consequence of the old German Drang nach Osten; William continued the Turkish policy of Frederick the Great but under new conditions. As long as the Germans pushed merely against the zone of small nations, and as long as the relations of Prussia to Austria were not definitely settled, Germany (Prussia) and Russia could be friends, the interest of both being purely continental, which fact made an agreement possible. Germany had in Russia a near and advantageous market for her energetic industry. As soon as Germany, after 1866, came to an understanding with Austria, and as both Berlin and Vienna became more active in the Balkans and Turkey, and when Germany embarked on colonial politics, and thereby made Africa as well as Asia the direct object of her plans, then France and England were brought nearer to Russia. Russia now took on a different significance for Germany; the weakening of Russia and the annexation of the Russian South-West (fertile soil—coal—Black Sea), became the new German policy, and the policy of the present war. The annexation of Western Russian Governments, the juggling with the Baltic Provinces, with Poland and the Ukraine, all that is the result of aiming at the organisation of a German Central Europe and domination in Asia and Africa. Berlin-Bagdad was broadened to Berlin-Warsaw-Kiev-Odessa. The East, Russia, and the zone of small nations, would mean far more to Germany than parts of the West (Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, or parts of France). Controlling the East, Germany would be enabled to conquer the West. Europe and humanity need an independent and strong Russia.
Russia cannot for some time make herself felt as a military force; Napoleon’s prophecy of a Cossack Europe has not been fulfilled; Europe is marching toward liberty and humanity. Russia, striving to be a republic and a democracy, will help Europe a great deal, and does help, although the excessive negativeness of her revolution weakens this
