Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 04.djvu/895

CIVIL SERVICE. 789 CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM. the feudal tenure of land, and some are heredi- tary. Indeed, by the common law of England, public olHee was a species of real property, held by a tenure, like hind, and vesting in the in- cumbent an estate, either for life or in fee. Even as late as the middle of the eighteenth century, ollices are enumerated by Blackstone in his clas- sitication of real property as one of the class of incorporeal hereditaments. (See Office.) To- day, however, most of the positions in the public service in England and all offices in the United States are, in law, regarded as held in trust for the public benefit ; and though an appointment to otiice usually vests in the inciunbent a certain definite right to perform its duties and enjoy its emoluments, it no longer entitles him to make merchandise of it, to alienate it, or to transmit it to his heirs. All public offices in the L iiitcd Slates being of comparatively recent ori- gin, and created by statute, there is much greater simplicity and uniformity in the mode of their creation and in the incidents of their tenure than in (Jreat Britain. Comparatively few positions in the public service here are held by a life-tenure ■ — the principal exceptions being lijgh judicial positions in the Federal service and in a few of the States. In many cases an office is held at the will of the appointing power, and by statute a large proportion of the positions in the Federal service are held by a four years' tenure. See Texire-of-Office Act. The power of appointment to the public ser- vice, even when, as is usually the ease, un- restricted in theory, may be practically limited by custom, by the despotism of political party control, or. as in the case of the President of the United States, by the operation of self-im- posed rules. The British Parliament, and many of the United States, have enacted laws restrict- ing the exercise of the power of appointments, and prescribing the qualifications for the civil ser'ice, and providing for an impartial method of selection among the candidates for office ; and iii several States these provisions have been em- bodied in the Constitution. The object of these laws being to raise the moral tone and improve the efficiency of the civil service by eliminating, so far as possible, political motives for appoint- ments, and by securing to the incumbents of public office independence of external control, whether personal or political, some form of the so-called 'merit system' (q.v. ) has generally been adopted. Similar boards exist in New York and in many other cities to govern appointments to municipal office. Tliis system will be fully de- scribed under that title; but it may be noticed, here, that it is based on the prineijjle of eom- ])etitive examinations, conducted by a board of ■administrative officers known usually as 'Civil- Service Commissioners.' The results of the ex- aminations and the rating of the candidates are reported by the Civil-Service Board to the ap- pointing officer, who makes his selection from among the names so certified to him, as the law may direct. The power of appointment being vested in the President of the United States by the Federal Constitution, it is not within the power of Con- gress to fetter his action by the enactment of siniil.nr laws. The merit system has. however, been extensively applied by the voluntary action of the President, most of the great departments of the (Jovernmcnt being now whoUj' or in large part under its operation — the most conspicuous exceptions being the past-ollices, the consular service, and the Census Bureau. In many of the States, by law, and in some de- partments of the Federal Administration by executive order, the independence of civil ser- vants has been further secured by provisions lestricling the jiowcr of removal from office, in many ca.ses by providing for a definite tenure, and in others by requiring the removing officer to file his reasons for making tlic proposed re- moval, and to give the accused official an oppor- tunity to be heard in his own defense. In still ether cases, ^here the tenure is for life, or 'during good behavior,' the action of the- remov- ing ofliccr may be reviewed by the courts, and the removed official reinstated it the grounds for the removal are deemed by the court to be insulfi- cient. Gencrail}', however, where the tenure is not permanent, the provisions above described operate solely as a check on hasty and incon- siderate .action, and as securing to the civil ser- vant reasonable notice and the consideration of his claims upon the office, and vest no power of review in the courts. It has been judiciallj' de- termined that the civil-service rules promulgated by the President of the United States do not have the force of general law, and confer upon members of the service no right to invoke the aid of the courts to protect them against viola- tion thereof. They are the President's law, and he alone can enforce them. The general effect of the adoption of the merit system afld of the legislation last referred to has been most salu- tary. The evils at which these laws were aimed, and the history of the popular movement which resulted in their general adoption, will be found set forth in the article on Civil-Service Eefohm. See Ashley, The American Federal State (New » York, l'J02) ; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution (Oxford, 1892) ; Eaton, Civil Ser- vice in Great Britain (Xew York, 1880) ; Good- now, Comparative Administrative Law (New York, 1893) : and the authorities referred to under Civil-Service FvEFORM. CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM. In the most general sense, the adoption, by legislation or executive action, of rules for improving the civil service of the State by prescribing the quali- fications of candidates for public office, and for the good behavior of public servants and their independence of external control. S])ccifically, and as commonly employed in the United States, the expression refers to the movement of the last hundred years in Great Britain and the United States for the elimination from the public ad- ministration of the corrupting influences of jiarty politics. Owing to the power which has usually at- tended the |)osscssion of public office and the lack of any <'li'cctivc supervision or criticism, jiublie administration has in all stages of political development been affected with corruption and inefficiency and extravagance. The various forms of autocratic government, which preceded the more popular governments of our day, furnished a peculiarly favorable soil for the growth of these evils. (See Civil Adxiinisthation.) It was a disappointing result of the first effective appearance of government 'by the people' in modern times, that it should not only have failed to correct these tendencies of the earlier rr'gime, hut should have intensified them and given them