Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 18.djvu/527

SPINOZA. 453 SPINOZA. is not only trun for the individuals in each at- tribute, but nocossarily for their relations also. Hence parallel with ever- physical causal series there is an ideational causal series reduplicating it; neither is dependent upon the other, but both depend ujion the divine substance made manifest through them. The individualit.v of things, whether ideas or physical objects, Spinoza explained as particular modes or 'atVeetions' of substance. All particular things in space are the modes of God in the attribute extension: all particular thoughts and feelings are modes of God in the attribute thought. The modes are natura naturata; sub- stance or God is natura naturans. The modes are ephemeral and their existence assumes tem- poral form ; God is eternal, outlasting all at- tributive changes. Particular things, accord- ingly, whether of body or mind, are evanescent and finite. All existence is mortal. Nevertheless there is an indestructible world. It is not to be found in the realm of existences, but in a realm of essences — something wliolly difl'erent. The Spinozistic conception of essence is most nearly related to the Scholastic concep- tion of Realism and to Plato's conception of a world of ideas. It is an hypostatization of the universal aspect of things, that is, of their essen- tial nature in a logical or definitive sense, and in many respects is a striking forecast of Hegel's logic of the Absolute. The most distinctive dif- ference between Spinoza's world of existences and his world of essences is that the former exists in time, while the latter has no temporal being. But mortality can pertain only to temporal being; therefore the world of essences, being timeiess, must be immortal. Furthermore, the world of essences is a world of immanent being. Every existence has a universal or essential char- acter, though to realize this character it must transcend its own intrinsic form, that is, free itself from whatever gives it particularity. The world of essences thus has a kind of being within the world of existences — as the immanent cause of the latter — though it does not share its tem- poral limitation. Now this is precisely true of the divine substance : and so it is that the world of essences represents the essential nature of God. Immanent causation means self-causation, and that which is self-determined is free. From this reasoning Spinoza derived his doctrine of free- dom to be won in the world of essences. Existence in the attribute is bondage, for each existent tiling is determined by its own causal series; ever_y par- ticular object or idea is subject to other objects or ideas, arid the form of its being is determined by them. Only in non-temporal, self-caused be- ing, that is, in the universal and immanent, is freedom possible; only by identification with the eternal verities, with substance or God, is im- mortality — and with it peace — to be obtained. FroTn this conception springs Spinoza's ethical doctrine, developed in the third, fourth, and fifth parts of the Ethica. In its practical form his teaching assumes that everything, so far as in it lies, strives to remain in its own being. The effort by which this striving is manifest is noth- ing but the actual essence of the thing. This effort, w hen it is in the mind alone, is will ; when in mind and body, it is appetite. If desire is satisfied, we have pleasure; if not, we have sorrow. All atfections and emotions resolve into desire, joy, and sorrow, accompanied by ideas. The good is that which we know to be useful, that is, that which we know to be a means for the nearer attainment of the standard of human nature which is our ideal. Knowledge of good and bad can be a cause in the moral world, cotniteracting passion and raising us from the world of appetite and mortality to the world of eternal truths. The passage from mortality to immortality, from bondage to freedom, is made plausible to Spinoza's mind by the fact that every reality has its immanent cau^e, its universal aspect, or what may be called its cosmological truth. By cultivating steadily this inunanent and uni- versal nature man is enabled to realize his im- mortal destiny. As to the nature of the initia- tive by which a soul in bondage is to alter it3 cour.se, Spinoza has no clear teaching. The prob- lem seems not to have presented itself to him, and indeed this is hardly to be wondered at, since his own mind turned so instinctively to what he conceived to be the divine and the good. Spinoza's position in the development of philo- sophical thought is in many respects unique. He belonged to no school and he founded none. While in a measure his work was based upon that of his predecessors, it is too strikingly indi- vidual to be conceived a mere continuation, even of Cartesian thought. In the vigor and com- prehensiveness of his conception, in synthetic daring, he must be ranked with the greatest philo- sophical thinkers; and though his system gave rise to no sequential development, he has had perhaps the most pervasive influence of any modern philosopher except Kant. Not only met- apliysicians, but poets such as Goethe, Words- •worfli, and Shelley, have gone to him for inspira- tion, and the essence of his thought has been in large part appropriated in the poetic pantheism of modern interpretations of nature. Complete editions of Spinoza's works have been published by Paulus (1802-03), by Bonden (1S43-40), and by Van Volten and Land (1882- 82), English translations have been made for the Bohn" Library (1883), by White and Stan- lay, the Ethics '(London, 1883), by Fullerton, Tlic Philosophy of Spinoza, selections with intro- duction (New York, 2d ed. 1804), Of the ex- tensive literature especially to be mentioned are: Caird, Spinoza (Edinburgh, 1888) ; Mar- tineau, A Study of Spinoza (London, 1882); Pollock, Spinoza (2d ed., ib., 1899) ; Fullerton, On Spinozistic Immortality (Philadelphia, 1899) ; Camerer, Die Lehrc Spinozas (Stuttgart, 1877); Baltzer, Spinozas Enturirkelungsgang (Kiel, 1888) ; Berendt and Friedliinder, Spinozas Erkcnntnislehre (Berlin, 1891); Hoflf, Die Striotslrhre Spinozas (ib., 1895) ; Kuno Fischer, Gesch'ichte der neueren PhilosopMe, I, (Heidel- berg, 1897). SPIE.a;A (Lat., from Gk. airiipala, speiraia, meadow-sweet, from o-xeipa, spcirn. coil, twist, spire; so called from the sliape of the follicles). A large gentis of herbs and low deciduous shrubs of the natural order Rosacea-, natives of the Northern Hemisphere. Dropwort {Spircea fili- prnduia) and meadow-sweet or queen of the meadow (Spircea ulmaria) are European species. Two other species are shown on the accompanying plate. Many species are cultivated in shrub- beries for their flowers.