Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 20.djvu/611

WILKINSON. 510 WILL. Epic of Saul (1801) ; The Epic of Paul (1898) ; and The Epic of iloscs (1903). WILL (AS. imlla, Goth, wilja, OHf}. v:illo, Gcr. Wille, will, wish, from AS. willan, Goth. wiljan, OHG. v-cUun, woUan, Ger. wollcn, to will, to wish ; eoiinectpd with Lat. vellc, Lith., OGliurch Slav, velcte, to w-ill, Welsli, Corn., Brpt. f/iiell, l)etter, Skt. var, to clioosc, or perhaps with Gk. idiXetv, ethclcin, flAeii", thelcin. Skt. harufi. to wisli). A term in psychoIoi.'y variously connoting volition. It may denote: (1) a gen- eral phase or mode of consciousness, as when will or willing is set over against thinking or intellection; or (2) it may he employed as the equivalent of voluntary action, action which has conscious antecedents as distinguished from re- flex and instinctive movements; or (.')) it may be restricted to the group of mental processes in- cluded in deliberation, choice, desire, and a con- scious anticipation of the result of action. Will, with this connotation, implies a selective activity. In the first sense ( 1 ) will corresponds to what was terniedj in the older psychologies, one of the fundamental faculties, or powers, or activities of mind. (See Faculty.) Will in the second sense (2) is discussed under Action. The terms vo- lition and conation are often used synonymously with it. See Con.tion. The eliief question in connection with the first definition of will is that of an ultimate and elementary will-quality constituting the essence of volition. Some psychologists eontend that there is such an unanalyzable quality, which they make coiirdinate with sensation and affection or feeling; others den}' that it exists and explain its apparent presence in conation or effort or the feeling of subjective initiation of action or thought by an analysis of consciovisness into strong affection, muscular and tendinous sensa- tions, and an idea of end or result toward the realization of which the organism is tending. (See Effort.) The question of an elementary will-quality loses much of its importance as soon as it becomes clear that it is a qviestion of analysis and has nothing whatever to do with the validity of will and the efficacy of the will as a determinant of action. A volition directed to- ward the selection of one of two possible lines of action, for example, has precisely the same sig- nificance whether there is in willing an ultimate conative element or whether the volition is a complex analyzable into a dozen part-processes all difl'erent from the whole. Introspective evi- dence in the matter of analyzability falls on both sides of the question, and the dispute at present ig undecided. It may be said, however, that those who claim an elementary quality of will often confuse a root-function, i.e. a primitive mode of eonscioiis action (q.v. ), with such a quality. It is, perhaps, true that, genetically, the remote ancestor of true volition was a simple, impulsive movement toward, or away frfim. an object; a movement which was accompanied b}' the consciousness of fruitful endeavor; i.e. a conative attitude toward a presented object. But even if this attitude were i)resent in the most primitive consciousness^ it does not follow that either it or its derivatives are qualitatively simple or that they coiitain an element which is lacking to other more 'passive' forms of con- sciousness. However we answer the question just pro- posed, we have still to give an analysis of will in the third sense, for (lelihcrative action is al- ways a highly complex groMjiing of elements. In such ;ietion the individual Ijolh feels (is pleas- antly or unpleasantly affected) and has vivid ideas (of movement, of results to be attained, etc.). We shall most easily understand its na- ture, its constituent parts, and its relation to otiier forms of consciousness by bringing it into c{mnection with attention (q.v.) and action. In Voluntary choice, attention is always active, i.e. there is more than a single claimant for the at- tention. In impulse, on the other hand, a single sensation or idea draws the attention and leaves no room for hesitation or choice. The first pe- culiarity of will (in the third sen.se) is, then, the turning of the attention to a thing which is not sullicientl.v attractive to hold the attention in the f/ircii siliiiiH'ni. Under ordinarj' circum- stances food is passively attended to by a hungry man, but it may ha])pen that a toothache bids so strongly for the attention that a powerful voli- tion is required in order to continue the process of eating. The effort involved in such a case and its subsequent success are (apart from social and ethical traditions) responsible for the belief in the subject's initiative in voluntary actions. There is no proof in the action itself that the ac- coni])anying consciousness of "willing" is causally related to the issue. ( For freedom of the will, see Determini.sm.) Psychology prefers to regartl the will as mechanically determined in the sense that, so far as the 'self is the agent, it is the psychophysical organism as modified by the in- dividual's whole experience and his inherited tendencies. (See Self; Sei.f-Consciousness ; Tendency: Dispcsition ; IMental Con.stitu- tion.) In deliberative action, then, the issue is not decided by the alternative 'attractions' set before consciousness, neither is the decision made by an occult power which intervenes and carries the day, but it is made b}' the predominance of one group of ideas over another in accordance with the habitual tendencies of discharge in the nervous system. Novv one of these groups is at- tended to, now another. Attention (([.v. ), it must be noted, is both an inhibiting and a facilitating process. As soon as one group has clarified and completed itself by the addition of associations and has inhibited the rise of its rival, delibera- tion ceases, for lack of material, and choice, the final term in the volition, ensues. The choice may take the form of resolve and may not issue in external action for days or even years. In the case of a profession to be chosen, the various associations which cluster around the verbal ideas, 'law' or 'medicine' or 'engineering,' to- gether with the pleasantness or unpleasantness which is always present in the state of atten- tion, form the motive to action. It is the com- position of this motive, and riot the resulting movements, which distinguishes the 'willed' ac- tion from the impulsive, ideomotor. instinctive, and refiex types. (See Apperception.) It is clear that the concept 'will' stands in need ot further delimitation and definition. Probably it will, in the future, find its most useful applica- tion in the sphere of deliberative action, i.e. in the last of the three uses indicated above. BlliLlOGRAPHY. .Tames, Principlrn of Psychol- ofiy (New York, 1890) ; Sully, Human Miyid (ib.,