rule—No, there were supposed stipulations: the punishment was supposed equal to the offence—hence that law which we find so universal in practice amongst those nations, which have not had the better sense of a community perverted by the wisdom of a cruel legislator like the Athenian Draco, or the Spartan Lycurgus—the lex talionis.
It is a matter of surprise, that the enlightened Greeks, who in speculative doctrines and in refined theories, have perhaps never been excelled, should submissively have bowed to their sanguinary laws, and should not have advanced any doubts with regard to the right of inflicting death. Even Plato in his treatise de Legibus can, without at all entering into the question of right and wrong, content himself by giving, as reasons for putting those whom he calls incurables, to death—first, that as a scarecrow they may be useful in deterring others; secondly, because by this means we clear the city of wicked men. How is it possible that Plato, one, whose name itself might be used as synonymous with wisdom, should write such reasons as this, and not perceive, that whatever might be the pretended use, still the justice was not proved by it. How could he speak on the subject of the punishment of death, and not inquire into the origin of the right. For to us it seems one of those questions, which would most naturally arise in the mind of every man. And the only manner in which we can explain its never having been started by the ancient sages, is by the knowledge of how perhaps unwilling, certainly how sluggish we are, in the discussion of those points which we find received by all, and by the knowledge of the reluctance in going over ground that has not yet been trod by others. We believe, Beccaria was the first who started the question, where resides the right of inflicting that death which is so constantly used without hesitation, by our judges, our jury, by individuals and nations? He, in that excellent work, Dei Delitti e Delle Pene, has
