jects who acknowledge them as their lords, and who entertain a particular affection for them. In a country governed by a prince and slaves, the prince has infinitely the greatest authority. In fact, in all his states there are none who acknowledge any other sovereign than himself, and if they pay obedience to others, it is as his ministers or officers, for whom they have no particular affection. Turkey and France furnish at present examples of these two kinds of ġovernment. The whole Turkish monarchy is governed by a master to whom all the others are slaves. He divides his kingdom into different provinces, and into them he sends divers administrators; he changes and recalls them at his will; but the King of France is placed amidst a crowd of ancient nobility, who having subjects that acknowledge and are attached to them, they are entitled to certain prerogatives, of which the king cannot without danger deprive them.
If we examine both these sovereignties, we shall find that there are great difficulties in the way of conquering a kingdom governed like that of Turkey, but that once effected, nothing is so easy as to preserve it. It is difficult to seize on such a statę, because he who would attempt it cannot be called in by the nobles of the kingdom, nor reckon on the assistance and rebellion of those who surround the prince. The motive of this is easily conceived by what we have said of its organization. In fact,
