To płace this natter in a clearer light, I must observe that the commanders of these troops, whether good or bad officers, are not to be trusted. In the first place, because they cannot effect their own elevation but by oppressing the prince who employs them, or others against his will; in doing the latter they must hasten the ruin of the state they serve so ill.
I may perhaps be told that every other commander with arms in his hand will do the same. To which I answer, that the state making war is either a monarchy or a republic. In the first case, a prince ought to put himself at the head of his armies; in the second, a republic ought to confer the command of her troops on one of her own citizens. If he should not be equal to it, she should nominate another; and if he is a great general, she should take especial care that he cannot exceed his orders.
It is certain that both republics and other states may of themselves effect great achievements, and that mercenary soldiers must inevitably injure both; and as to republics, I wil add, that they are better guarded ağainst the oppression of him who commands their armies, when instead of foreign mercenaries they employ national troops. Rome and Spata by these means maintained their liberties for several ages, and the Swiss woulk not
