defeated; and from his auxiliaries, who had but a small share in obtaining the victory.
The Florentines wishing to besiege Pisa, and being entirely destitute of national troops, took into their service ten thousand French, an error vhich drew on them mischiefs they had never before experienced. The Emperor of Constantinople being threatened by his neighbours, caused ten thousand: Turks to enter Greece, which at the end of the war he could not driye out again, and that provinces, became subjected to the infidels.
The prince, therefore, who would deprive bim self of the power of conquering, has only to apply this kind of military force, which is still worse than mercenary troops; because they form. a separate body, and are under the command of another. Mercenaries, on the contrary, being raised by him who takes them into his pay, and not forming a separate hody, cannot so easily injure him after having vanquished his enemies. Their general, named by the prince himself, cannot immediately acquire such authority over those he commands, as to turn their arms against his employer. Finally, I. am of opinion, that there is much more to be dreaded from the valour of auxiliary troops, than from the cowardice of mercenaries; and a wise prince wil prefer being defeated with his own troops only, than to cọnquer with auxiliaries, insomuch as that is no true, viotory which is gained by foreign aid.
