Provisional Government make an official renunciation of any program of annexations, but as long as these conditions are unfulfilled and the war continues, the revolutionary democracy must support the war in all ways. This attitude was emphasized by the appearance at the Congress of George Plekhanov, Russian social-patriot, and Will Thorne and M. Moutet, sent by the British and French governments, who pledged Russian and Allied labor to the war. At the same time, the Congress decisively rejected a resolution of the Bolsheviki that the Soviets should assume all government power, but a proclamation was issued to the people to disregard orders of the Provisional Government where they conflicted with the Council's.
All this, of course, was in contravention of the desires of the masses and the objects of the Revolution. The Provisional Government was distincly counter-revolutionary, and yet it was supported by the representative of the masses, the Soviet. On all issues the government adopted a reactionary policy. It did not make any effort or lay plans to convene the Constituent Assembly. It did not energetically act to provide food for the people, being restrained by its capitalistic affiliations and interests. It acted against the expropriated peasantry by protecting the interests of the large propertied owners. It retained the bureaucracy of the old regime and its attitude on all large problems of policy. It proclaimed itself die government for carrying on an imperialistic war, in spite of promises and subterfuges to the contrary. The Provisional Government allowed the institutions of the old regime to exist, and directed its activity toward the disarming of the masses and the castration of the Revolution. Minister of War Guchkov used every means and opportunity to destroy the Soviets in the army, and die Soviets behind the front were intrigued against in an effort to destroy their influence and existence. On all general problems of the Revolution the Provisional Government was reactionary; but it was its reactionary attitude on war and peace that was most manifest to the masses, provoking discontent and action.
On April 9, in answer to the universal unrest and questionings on war aims. Premier Lvov had declared in favor of "a durable peace based on the fights of nations to decide their own destiny." This was construed by the moderate Socialists as favoring the Revolution's program of "no annexations, no indemnities, and self-determination of nations." But the secret treaties of Czarism had been neither repudiated nor published: until this was done, words had not even the empty value oi words. And on May 1. Minister of Foreign Affairs Milyukov, in a note to the representatives of the Provisional Government in the Entente countries, emphasized "the nation's determination to bring the war to a decisive victory. … The Provisional Government in safeguarding the rights acquired for our country will maintain a strict regard for its engagements with the allies of Russia."
This was the signal for the elemental bursting forth of the indignation and protests of the masses, which had been accumulating for six weeks. It was accelerated but not produced by the intensive and uncompromising propaganda of the Bolsheviki. The Council, apprehensive of the impending action of the masses, demanded that the Provisional Government withdraw Milyukov's note accepting the old treaty obligations, that the treaties should be published and active steps taken to end the war. The government declined to modify the May 1 note of Milyukov. The masses in Petrograd broke loose. On May 2 and 3 the workers demonstrated in great masses,
