present period, when, in the interests of a successful final offensive, it is necessary to "halt" the offensive for the present.
This can be explained by comparing our position in the war against capital with the position of a victorious army which has captured, let us say, half or two thirds of the enemy's territory and is compelled to halt the offensive in order to recuperate, to increase the supply of ammunition, to repair and to strengthen the communication lines, to build new store-houses, to bring up new reserves, etc. A halt in the offensive of the victorious army under such conditions is necessary in the interests of conquering the remaining territory from the enemy, that is, in the interests of complete victory. Whoever fails to understand that just such a "halt" in the offensive against capital is dictated to us by the objective situation of the pesrent period does not understand anything of this situation.
Of course, we can speak only metaphorically of a "halt" in the offensive against capital. In an ordinary war it is possible to issue a general order to halt the offensive, it is possible actually to stop the forward movement. In the war against capital the movement forward cannot be stopped, and there can be no question of our renouncing any further expropriation of capital. We are considering here changing the centre of gravity of our economic and political work. Heretofore measures for the immediate expropriation of the expropriators were prominent. At present prominence must be given to the organization of accounting and control in those enterprises in which the capitalists have already been expropriated.
Were we to attempt now to continue the expropriation of capital with the same intensity as heretofore, we would surely be defeated, for our work in the organization of proletarian accounting and control has—it is clear and obvious to every thinking person—not kept pace with the work of the direct "expropriation of the expropriators." If we will now turn all our efforts to the work of the organization of accounting and control, we shall be able to solve this problem, we shall overcome our shortcomings and win our "campaign" against capital.
But is not the admission that we have shortcomings to overcome, equivalent to an admission that some mistake has been committed? Not at all. We will again use a military example. If the enemy can be defeated and forced back by the use of light cavalry only, this should be done. And if this can be done successfully only up to a certain line, it is quite conceivable that beyond this line it becomes necessary to bring up the heavy artillery. Admitting that it is
