comparable, and beyond this its cardinal principles of continuity and evolution will not enable it to go. Neither by regressing can it reach a lowest limit or origin, in which all diversity is latent; nor by progressing can it reach a highest limit or goal in which all plurality is transcended. This, the pluralist’s extremity, will doubtless be regarded as the singularist’s opportunity. But the latter so far has never succeeded — without doing violence to the facts — in advancing beyond a more or less covert dualism of the One and the Many, of God and the World. The connexion of these two, that is to say, remains a problem. Thus in the latest and one of the most important expositions of singularism, its author, Mr Bradley, tells us: — “The fact of actual fragmentariness, I admit, I cannot explain. That experience should take place in finite centres, and should wear the form of finite ‘thisness,’ is in the end inexplicable. But” — he adds — “to be inexplicable and to be incompatible are not the same thing.”[1] Here we have the whole matter in a nutshell. If pluralism is ‘infected with contradictions,’ as Mr Bradley affirms, we must turn, he contends, to singularism, that is to say, to Absolutism. If such an Absolute Being as he supposes, is possible, then, in view of the said contradictions, it must be declared actual. If, as we maintain, it is not possible, then we are reduced to scepticism, unless the asserted contradictions can be resolved. Even though not compelled by contradictions altogether to abandon pluralism, we ought to prefer Theism if that systematizes more and disappoints less. The difficulties of pluralism then must be our next topic.
- ↑ Appearance and Reality, 2nd edn, p. 226.
