But then does this sentiment exhaust for Schopenhauer the whole meaning of pity? In no wise. Not for this sole reason is pity the whole basis of morality, namely, because it is the only non-egoistic impulse in us; but besides this reason, there is the second reason used by Schopenhauer to give special dignity to pity. This other reason is in fact the deeper basis for him of pity as the principle of conduct. Pity is namely a revelation in concrete form of a great fundamental truth, the one above referred to, the great fact of the ultimate and metaphysical Oneness of all sentient beings. Because pity reveals this, therefore has this sentiment an authority, a depth and a significance that a sentiment, merely as such, could never have.
About this aspect of the matter, Schopenhauer instructs us more than once in his writings. A few quotations from one discussion will serve for present illustration.
“The difference between my own and another’s person seems for experience an absolute difference. The difference of space that separates me from my neighbor, separates me also from his joy and pain. But on the other hand, it must still be remarked, that the knowledge that we have of ourselves is no complete and clear knowledge.”[1] . . . “Whereon is founded all variety and all multiplicity of beings? On space and time; through these alone is variety or multiplicity possible, since what is many can only be conceived as coexistent or as successive. Because the many like things are called individuals, I therefore call space and time, as making possible the existence of a multitude
- ↑ Grundlage der Moral, p. 267.
