THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ
would convert our enemies in Europe, but that it would start a current of public opinion in our favor strong enough to balk their schemes, especially in England. And if it did this in England, the matter was decided, for the French Emperor would not venture upon the risky task of actively interfering with our home concerns without Great Britain's consent and support. Subsequent events have proved this expectation to have been well founded. Of this I shall have more to say hereafter.
I awaited Mr. Seward's reply to my despatch with intense anxiety. Meanwhile there were other things to keep me busy. Much of my correspondence with my government, as well as with the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, referred to the treatment of ships in Cuban ports, which treatment had, owing to the newness of the situation created by our civil war, fallen into some confusion. The ensuing troubles were always easily adjusted. But I may mention a little incident which, at the time, puzzled and annoyed me very much. One day, early in October, I had a conversation with Don Calderon Collantes in which I called his attention to a report going through the American and European press that Spain was about to recognize the independence of the Southern Confederacy and to break up the blockade of the Southern ports. I added that, of course, I could not believe, etc., etc. The Minister replied with the strongest protestations of good faith and friendship towards the United States. Nothing could be further from the intentions of Her Majesty's government, etc., etc. “But,” he added, “there are things”—and, interrupting himself, he asked me, whether I had not, within the last two days, received despatches from my government? I answered that I had not; whereupon he went to his desk and took out a paper which he presented to me as a copy of a despatch addressed to me by
[ 287 ]
