639. Before the invasion, the JIC and the DIS had each identified that there was a risk
of lawlessness breaking out in Iraq, and that it would be important to deal with it swiftly.
Others, including Mr Blair, Sir Kevin Tebbit and the Iraq Policy Unit, had recognised the
seriousness of that risk.
640. However, the formal authorisation for action in Iraq issued by Adm Boyce on 18 March contained no instruction on how to establish a safe and secure environment if lawlessness broke out as anticipated. Although it was known that Phase IV would begin quickly, no Rules of Engagement for that phase, including for dealing with lawlessness, were created and promulgated before UK troops entered the country.
641. Both before and during the invasion Lt Gen Reith made the absence of instructions to UK forces covering what to do if faced with lawless behaviour by the Iraqi population in Basra explicit to the Chiefs of Staff.
642. Faced with widespread looting after the invasion, and without instructions, UK commanders had to make their own judgements about what to do. Brigadier Graham Binns, commanding the 7 Armoured Brigade which had taken Basra City, told the Inquiry that he had concluded that “the best way to stop looting was just to get to a point where there was nothing left to loot”.[1]
643. Although the implementation of tactical plans to deal with lawlessness was properly the responsibility of in‑theatre commanders, it was the responsibility of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief of Joint Operations to ensure that appropriate Rules of Engagement were set, and preparations made, to equip commanders on the ground to deal with it effectively. They should have ensured that those steps were taken.
644. The impact of looting was felt primarily by the Iraqi population rather than by Coalition Forces. The latter initially experienced a “honeymoon period”,[2] although the situation was far from stabilised.
645. Lt Gen Reith anticipated that UK forces could be reduced to a medium scale effort by the autumn, when he expected the campaign to have reached “some form of ‘steady‑state’”.[3]
646. The JIC correctly judged on 16 April that the local population had high hopes that the Coalition would rapidly improve their lives and that “resentment of the Coalition ... could grow quickly if it is seen to be ineffective, either politically or militarily. Such resentment could lead to violence.”[4]
- ↑ Private hearing, 2 June 2010, page 11.
- ↑ Public hearing Walker, 1 February 2010, page 16.
- ↑ Minute Reith to SECCOS, 14 April 2003, ‘Phase 4: Roulement/Recovery of UK Forces’ attaching Paper CJO, 14 April 2003, ‘Phase 4 ‑ Roulement/Recovery of UK Land Forces’.
- ↑ JIC Assessment, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: The Initial Landscape Post‑Saddam’.
