guiltless of even involuntary deceit or falsehood, and if we are quit of all our debts of sacrifice to God and of money to man, and to this result money largely contributes. It has indeed many other uses; but setting one thing against another, I should regard this as not the least of the uses of wealth to a man of sense.”
“What you say, Cephalus, is excellent,” I said. “But as to this justice, can we quite without qualification define it as truthfulness and repayment of anything that we have received ; or are these very actions sometimes just and some- times unjust? For example, if we had been given weapons by a friend when he was of sound mind, and he went mad and reclaimed them, it would surely be universally admitted that it would not be right to give them back. Any one who did so, and who was prepared to tell the whole truth to a man in that state, would not be just.”
“You are right,” he said.
“Then this is not the definition of justice—speaking the truth and restoring what we have received?”
“Yes, but it is, Socrates,” broke in Polenfairchus, “ if we are to believe Simonides.”
“Well, well,” said Cephalus, “I leave the argument with you, for it is time for me to attend to the sacrifice.”
“Then am I,” said Polemarchus, “left to inherit your share?”
“Certainly,” he said smiling, and departed to sacrifice.
“Come, then,” I said, “you who have inherited the argument, what is this saying of Simonides about justice of which you approve?”
“That to render to every man what is owing is just,” said he, “and I for one think he was right in so saying.”
“Well,” I said, “Simonides is one whom we cannot lightly disbelieve. He was a wise and godlike man. But as to what this saying means, you, Polemarchus, may know that; I certainly do not. For it clearly does not mean what we were Just saying, repayment of what has been given to a man 332 in pledge if the claimant is out of his senses. Yet surely what has been given in pledge is owing, is it not?”
6
