to the production of good administrators, we are not altogether wanting in an emergency, and we had profited somewhat from the errors of our neighbors in 1870, '71. Our army had been placed on a respectable footing in point of numbers; it was well officered under the new system of selection; both Regulars and Irregulars had been supplied with the most improved pattern of breech-loaders; our artillery, as regards quality, was (what Bugeaud said of our infantry) the best in Europe; the coast had been carefully surveyed, earthworks thrown up in some places, rifle pits and trenches dug in others, and railway communication rendered so complete that a large force might be concentrated at the shortest notice on a point. It need hardly be added that our diplomatic agents were on the alert, so that an enormous armament could not be got together in any quarter of Europe without creating an alarm. In point of fact, our Government were opportunely advised that the invasion was seriously meditated, and that they must be simultaneously on their guard against an American squadron which was to co-operate in a Fenian insurrection of Ireland. The bulk of the English Navy was, as usual, scattered abroad, but the Channel Fleet, complete in numbers and equipment, was in the Downs, and a number of gunboats and other vessels had been equipped and put to sea under orders similar to those issued by Nelson when Napoleon was meditating an invasion from Boulogne:
"Do not throw away your lives uselessly; retreat towards your own shores before an overwhelming force; but if the enemy attempt to land, dash among them at all hazards, and fight on till you sink them or are sunk."
