reference to that time, the various steps in the conquest of England; is there any reason to believe that similar ingenuity is less misplaced now?
We cannot but think that this is little more than a question of military curiosity. The political expectations which the writer of The Second Armada, for the purpose of his narrative, represents as falsified, we believe to be so well founded that England may safely take them as the basis of her policy. Never has there been a period when an Invasion of England was less feasible. The interests and aims of United Germany do really point to a pacific policy. She does require peace to consolidate her Empire, and she cannot make war without calling men from their various pursuits at a cost which a nation will only bear when its dearest interests are at stake. Whatever boasting on the subject of a war with England comes from beyond the Rhine arises, in our opinion, very much from the instinct which prompts men to try to frighten those who proclaim their apprehensions after a fashion which the world cannot help thinking ludicrous. Fussiness is, unfortunately, one of our political characteristics. It is, perhaps, an inevitable result of popular institutions, and of the intense interest which a people informed of the minutest details of public life takes in the discussion of every incident. We debate all our national concerns in public, and the distinction which is to be gained by taking part in political controversy insures that every opinion, however unreasonable or unworthy, shall find somebody to maintain it. Foreigners are surprised at the way in which Englishmen run down their own country, represent its statesmen as fools, its
