CHAPTER VII
Foreign Office v. Army. June 1916
ur check in Mesopotamia was a disappointment to us, but McMahon continued the evacuation of Gallipoli, the surrender of Kut, and the generally unfortunate aspect of the war at the moment. Few people, even of those who knew all the negotiations, had really believed that the Sherif would fight; consequently his eventual rebellion and opening of his coast to our ships and help took us and them by surprise.
We found our difficulties then only beginning. The credit of the new factor was to McMahon and Clayton: professional jealousies immediately raised their heads. Sir Archibald Murray, the General in Egypt, wanted, naturally enough, no competitors and no competing campaigns in his sphere. He disliked the civil power, which had so long kept the peace between himself and General Maxwell. He could not be entrusted with the Arabian affair; for neither he nor his Staff had the ethnological competence needed to deal with so curious a problem. On the other hand, he could make the spectacle of the High Commission running a private war sufficiently ridiculous. His was a very nervous mind, fanciful and essentially competitive.
When confronted with what he considered a rival show, he bent his considerable powers to crab it. He found help in his Chief of Staff, General Lynden Bell, a red soldier, with an instinctive shuddering away from politicians, and a conscientiously assumed heartiness. His military conception of the loyalties of his office involved him in a chameleon-like attempt to imitate the frailties as well as the virtues of his Chief. Two of the General Staff officers followed their leaders full cry; and so the unfortunate McMahon found himself deprived of Army help and
