is utilitarian; the preservation of the individual is the "root" of theoretical truth. Černov has failed to reflect that from this standpoint he might readily lapse into the detested metaphysics and even into religion, for from this outlook it might easily be made to appear that religion is useful for the preservation of the individual and of the species (compare, for example, Benjamin Kidd’s Social Evolution).
Černov pleads for unity of theory and practice. In support of this he can appeal to Herzen, and he is influenced, too, by his fondness for monism. Further, he bases himself on Marx, who represented "practically critical" activity as revolutionary practice. For Černov, socialism is at once an instrument of research and a measure of value; it is a revolutionary philosophy, simultaneously the philosophy of reality and of activity;[1] the "active-dynamic" school of sociology is for him the scientific equivalent of practical revolutionary socialism.
In contrast with Marx and Engels, Černov recognises the existence of a universally valid morality. The conscious, critically thinking individuality (of Lavrov) does not accept class morality, for this is of purely accidental origin, the outcome of birth, environment, etc., whereas socialism must recognise a universally valid morality. Positivist, historical foresight does not suffice as a guide to action, does not suffice the revolutionary. Foresight relates solely to the temporary result of the decision; but the socialist has ideals, and the ideal is something more than foresight. Foresight is the outcome of observation, whilst the ideal goal is prescribed by feeling. The revolution, in Černov's sense, therefore contains subjective ideal factors, whereas Marx entertained a fatalistic optimism based upon a claim to the foreknowledge of historical events.
In this matter, as in general, Černov does not get beyond the sphere of psychology. We can see that he is influenced by the antihistorism, the voluntarism, and the emotionalism of Nietzsche (and of Schopenhauer, etc.). But he does not attempt an epistemological foundation and appraisement of morality; he does not try to explain why emotion is better, more right, than intelligence, or to which feelings the assertion applies. Speaking generally, we may say that Černov's
- ↑ The Russian term for "reality" is "děistvitel'nost," that for "action" or "activity" is dějanie; this facilitates Černov's comparison.
