v. Biddle overturned the most important land-claimant laws of Kentucky on the ground of unconstitutionality.[1]
While this correspondence presents such affirmative
proof of the reasons for hostility to the Federal Courts,
it contains also negative proof that there was no particular antagonism to the power of the Judiciary in general
to pass upon the constitutionality of Acts of Congress.
For, while Senator Breckenridge had attacked the
existence of this power in the debates in Congress,
nevertheless, not one of the mass of letters which he
received from constituents congratulating him on his
services in securing the repeal of the Circuit Court Act
and setting forth at length the writers' views as to the
defects of that Act, contained a single expression denying or even questioning the lawful existence of judicial
supremacy.[2]
As soon as the Republicans passed their Act repealing the Federalist statute, they determined upon another even more radical exercise of Legislative power. Realizing that the question of its constitutionality would be at once questioned in the Courts and presented to the Supreme Court for final decision, they resolved to prevent, or at least postpone, any such decision until at least after lapse of time sufficient to strengthen the political power of the Administration. Accordingly, immediately after the enactment of the Repeal Law, a further bill was introduced, and after a short debate passed, abolishing the new June and December Terms of the Supreme Court (created by the Act of 1801), and restoring the old February Term but not the old August Term. By this extraordinary Legislative maneuver, an
- ↑ See Chapter Fifteen, infra.
- ↑ Breckenridge Papers MSS. For leading letters of congratulations received in 1802, see letter of William Vawter, Feb. 20, Robert Breckenridge, Feb. 19, Richard P. Barry, Feb. 21, Judge Harry Innes, Feb. 22, April 8, James Morison, Feb. 27, James Blair, March 2, Bartlet Collin, March 5, John Shore, March 14, Mathew Lyon, March 19.
