Page:The Supreme Court in United States History vol 1.djvu/271

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THE MANDAMUS CASE

243

decided, then unquestionably it became the duty of the Court to pass upon its constitutionality. Marshall naturally felt that in view of the recent attacks on judicial power it was important to have the great principle firmly established, and undoubtedly he welcomed the opportunity of fixing the precedent in a case in which his action would necessitate a decision in favor of his political opponents. Accordingly, after reviewing the provisions of the Constitution as to the original jurisdiction of the Court, he held that there was no authority in Congress to add to that original jurisdiction, that the statute was consequently invalid, and that it was the duty of the Court so to declare. In comprehensive and forceful terms, which for over one hundred years have never been successfully controverted, he proceeded to lay down the great principles of the supremacy of the Constitution over statute law, and of the duty and power of the Judiciary to act as the arbiter in case of any conflict between the two. "This principle," as has been well said, "is wholly and exclusively American. It is America's original contribution to the science of law. The assertion of it, under the conditions . . . was the deed of a great man.^[1]

Had Marshall's opinion in this case been confined exclusively to a determination of the validity of the

↑ Marshall, III, 142. William Trickett in Marbury v. Madison, Critique, Amer. Law Rev. (1919), LIII, says that it gave Marshall "an opportunity to administer a lecture" to Jefferson. Edward S. Corwin in The Doctrine of Judicial Review (1914), 9, and Mich. Law Rev. (1911, 1914), X, XII, says: "Regarded as a judicial decision, the decision of Marbury v. Madison must be considered as most extraordinary, but regarded as a political pamphlet designed to irritate an enemy to the very limit of endurance, it must be considered a huge success." And again he says: "To speak quite frankly, this decision bears many of the earmarks of a deliberate partisan coup. The Court was bent on reading the President a lecture on his legal and moral duty to recent Federalist appointees to judicial office . . . but at the same time hesitated to invite a snub, by actually asserting jurisdiction of the matter." Nothing in Marshall's character, however, justifies such imputation of low-minded and unjudicial motives, and the criticism seems too severe.

[1] Marshall, III, 142. William Trickett in Marbury v. Madison, Critique, Amer. Law Rev. (1919), LIII, says that it gave Marshall "an opportunity to administer a lecture" to Jefferson. Edward S. Corwin in The Doctrine of Judicial Review (1914), 9, and Mich. Law Rev. (1911, 1914), X, XII, says: "Regarded as a judicial decision, the decision of Marbury v. Madison must be considered as most extraordinary, but regarded as a political pamphlet designed to irritate an enemy to the very limit of endurance, it must be considered a huge success." And again he says: "To speak quite frankly, this decision bears many of the earmarks of a deliberate partisan coup. The Court was bent on reading the President a lecture on his legal and moral duty to recent Federalist appointees to judicial office . . . but at the same time hesitated to invite a snub, by actually asserting jurisdiction of the matter." Nothing in Marshall's character, however, justifies such imputation of low-minded and unjudicial motives, and the criticism seems too severe.

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