Page:The Vedanta-sutras, with the Sri-bhashya of Ramanujacharya.djvu/41

in the way of the theory of maya is spoken of as Pramananupapatti ; and its discussion is started with the plausible supposition that the ' ignorance ' known as avidyd is capable of being directly experienced and has thus the nature of such a positive entity as cannot be contradicted by the witnessing principle of intelligence, and that it is therefore quite consistent with reason to realise that this avidya is definitively associated with the thing T. And it is further shewn here supposititiously that it is possible to establish by logical inference also that there is an ' ignorance ' or avidya which does not mean a mere negation of knowledge but is itself a positive entity of some sort (pp. 163-167.). These suppositions are then replied to one after another. It is first shewn that, so far as the relation to the intelligent internal self is concerned, there can be no difference between the ignorance that is a mere non-existence of knowledge and the other supposed ' ignorance' which has the nature of a positive entity (pp. 167-168.). It is then argued that in the cognition 'I am ignorant; I do not know myself, nor do I know another' what is experienced is only that ignorance which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge (pp. 168-169.). It is next shown that the Brahman can have no experience of any kind of avidya, and that, if it be a positive entity, there can be no removal of it by means of any knowledge (pp. 169-171.). The Brahman cannot be a witness of ' ignorance '; because it is impossible for Him, whose essential nature is absolute self-experience, to acquire the character of a witness without the concealment of His own true nature. And the Brahman, who is without parts and without attributes, and who is pure luminosity itself, cannot at all be concealed (pp. 171-172.). This supposed concealment of the Brahman by means of ignorance cannot