consciousness the thing as it is not. Of these two theories the former which is realistic is shewn to be true on the authority of tradition and scriptural teaching, and illusion and its stultification are accounted for by means of the belief that every thing in the universe has the characteristics of every other thing therein (pp. 179-186.). Scriptural and traditional authority is quoted to prove that even dream-perceptions are realistic. Then a number of exceptions apparently contradicting this realistic theory of perception such exceptions as the yellow appearance of white things to the jaundiced eye, the circle of fire produced by the rotation of a fire-brand, <&c., are all explained so as to show that all perceptions are undoubtedly realistic (pp. 186-191.). The objects corresponding to all perceptions are real ; only some perceptions are experienced by certain particular persons only and last only for a short length of time, while others are experienced by all generally and have a longer duration. These latter stultify the former, as stultification is commonly understood ; and a true theory of perception does not at all stand in need of a positive avidya (pp. 191-192.). It is next shewn that the scriptural authorities relied upon by the Ad wait ins to prove that there is an avidya, which cannot be described either as an entity or as a non -entity, are all to be explained otherwise, and do not therefore tend to establish in any way such an avidya (pp. 192-197.). The Itihasas and the Puranas are also shewn to give no support to the theory of maya, in as much as all such passages in them as seem to lend any support to this theory have, when properly considered, to be interpreted other- wise (pp. 197-210.).
The sixth difficulty in the way of this theory of the world being an illusion produced by mava is then fully
