correspondence with our government, militated against prompt action. We strongly desired to settle with Mexico and evacuate 'the country, and hence — especially after the peace negotiations began — it would not have been wise to run the risk of exasperating the nation for the sake of a few dollars. In short the net proceeds, including $106,928 turned in by naval officers, were only $3,935,676.[1]
Some of this money went directly to supply needs of the army and navy, but by far the greater part of those needs had to be met in other ways. During the first nine months of 1847, it was figured that the United States exported more than $12,000,000 in specie to Mexico. Many drafts on the principal American cities were sold there, and those on the quartermasters at New Orleans, Philadelphia, Washington and New York amounted to nearly $8,000,000 before December, 1847. Payments were also made in the United States on the certificates of officers acting in the field; and about the first of August, 1847, Belmont, the New York agent of the Rothschilds, arranged with our administration to place funds in the hands of any paymaster or quartermaster named by Scott. In general the large financial operations made necessary by the transfers of money were skilfully, honestly and safely conducted. Some $24,000,000 were distributed by the pay department through its thirty-five officers, for instance, and nothing was lost by accident, robbery, theft or capture.[2]
The total money cost of the war on the American side has been given at very low and at very high amounts, and none of the estimates inspires much confidence. The excess expenditures of the army and navy appear to have been $63,605,621; of which $49,000,000 were raised by selling bonds and treasury notes, and were substantially added to the national debt. But these figures by no means answer the question. To the apparent cost we must add twelve millions paid later to Mexico, the American claims of which we relieved her, the war expenses of the treasury department, bounty lands, pensions, valid claims for damages, and other liabilities of many kinds gradually discharged after peace returned; and from the total must be subtracted the bonds and treasury notes then available for issue and the actual worth of ships, ordnance and other materials required for the war and left over. Evidently it is not feasible
