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ENGLAND DISPOSED TO INTERVENE
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hended from the government, since the country would restrain it.[1] Even Guizot, when bitterest at heart, found it necessary to profess high respect for that "great nation," the United States.[2]

June 6, 1846 — that is to say, without loss of time — Aberdeen, the British minister of foreign affairs, intimated to McLane in a private conversation, unofficially, and upon his personal responsibility, that should Polk desire it, "he would be happy, in a more formal way, to propose a mediation."[3] This proposal, received by McLane in his private capacity only, was duly made known to our government, but it elicited no reply. Our silence did not please Palmerston, who succeeded Aberdeen about the beginning of July; and that young "fop with grey hair," as Le Journal des Débats described him, resolved to propose mediation in such terms as to require an answer.[4]

Soon after the middle of August, therefore, he instructed Pakenham to ascertain whether a formal offer of mediation would be acceptable, and if so to make it in "the form which might be agreed upon" by Pakenham and Buchanan.[5] The only result, however, was a memorandum received from our government on September 11, which said that it duly appreciated the friendly spirit of the British Cabinet, that it desired to make peace upon just and honorable terms and had therefore made an overture to Mexico on July 27, and that it thought the formal mediation of a foreign power unnecessary and inexpedient, but would regard with favor any influence used to induce Mexico to accept this overture.[6] Later Pakenham improved every opportunity to remind Buchanan of the British government's "anxious desire. . . to be useful in bringing about a reconciliation between the two Republicks," but he found himself unable to accomplish anything in this direction.[7]

The real question, however, was whether Great Britain would forcibly interpose. Such a policy she forbade Mexico to count on, saying that she could not be expected to assume the chief burden of a war which had resulted from the failure of that country to act upon her advice;[8] but this did not bind her own hands, and no doubt the government felt a pressure, if not a leaning, in the direction of interference. Both

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