a manufacturing establishment near Contreras. It seemed to be of no strategic significance, and was not likely to be heard of at a distance. The fortifications along the highway were largely developed after Scott turned. toward San Agustín. Valencia's movements were impromptu. Scott had an Englishman residing at Mexico in his pay, and we know that two persons brought data on Aug. 19 (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 162). Apparently Scott did his duty as to seeking information.
6. American preliminaries. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 304, 307, 315, 348-50 (reports of Scott, Worth and Smith); app., 41 (Mason); 66 (Smith); 101 (Magruder); 118 (Cadwalader). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 307. Picayune, Sept. 8; Oct. 21. 66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. Semmes, Service, 380, 393. 224Intercepted Letters (26, To Old Gentleman). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 275. Grant, Mems.,1, 142. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 188 (Trist, no. 12). 76Expediente contra Valencia. 236Judah, diary. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Hardcastle to Smith). Monitor Repub., Dec. 17. Diario, Aug. 19.
7. Quitman had only the Second Pennsylvania, the Marines, Steptoe's battery and a troop or two of dragoons (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 341); but Worth's division was available in case of need. See Claiborne, Quitman, i, 347.
8. Pillow, as was decided by a court of inquiry (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 332-45) on the testimony of such men as Lee (p. 78), Smith (p. 102), Riley (p. 147) and Shields (p. 268), did not devise the plan on which this victory was gained; and when Lee brought word to Scott of Smith's plan he washed his hands of it (335Trist, draft of address; Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 833); but he had the audacity to claim that Smith merely executed the precise plans and views laid down by Pillow for his guidance (Ho. 60; 30,1, p. 1018). Pillow could claim the credit only on the ground that he was the senior officer on the field, and that Smith's operations were a logical consequence of the events; but Scott was the senior of Pillow, and all that occurred was — as Smith pointed out (Sen. 65; 30,1, p. 104) — the logical consequence of Scott's order to gain possession of the San Angel road. The consensus of opinion was expressed by Twiggs: General Smith deserves the whole credit (Stevens, Stevens, i, 196). Moreover the famous letter signed "Leonidas" — prepared at Pillow's quarters doubtless with his connivance (Hitchcock in Mo. Republican, Oct. 2, 1857; Republican Banner, Feb. 23, 1858), conveyed by his agency (Davis, Autobiog., 285) to the New Orleans Delta, which published it Sept. 10 (chap. xxix, note 31), and fathered (when exposed) by an untruthful subordinate of his — "puffed" Pillow in the most extravagant manner for this "unparallelled victory," and represented Scott not only as leaving everything to Pillow but as blundering sadly. E.g. it said, "The army had been marching through marshes and almost impassable roads, nearly half around the city, to find some points upon the enemy's works that could be successfully assailed," the provisions had been nearly exhausted, and the mountains prevented going farther; Pillow's "plan of battle [at Contreras], and the disposition of his forces were most judicious," and he 'achieved this signal and brilliant victory."' (For the letter signed "Leonidas" see Sen. 65; 30, 1 (pp. 385-9, and the testimony of Pillow, Burns, Freaner, Trist); 335Pillow to Trist, Aug. 31, private; St. Louis Evening News, Oct. 2, 1857; chap. xxix, pp. 435-7.)
Pillow's design in having such a statement prepared and placed before the people in advance of the official reports was probably to influence public opinion in the United States so as to make him an available candidate for the Presidency or enable Polk to put him in Scott's place. As Pillow was
